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COMMENT
DON'T SAY "GUN": IS CENSORSHIP OF STUDENT
"GUN" SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS A PERMISSIBLE
INCULCATION OF SHARED COMMUNITY VALUES OR
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ESTABLISHMENT OF
ORTHODOXY?
Melanie E. Migliacciol
I. INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution' prohibits the
government from prescribing an orthodox belief and protects from
abridgement the right to speak about controversial matters. The Second
Amendment2 recognizes the right of the American citizen to own and carry
firearms. Yet a clash of these two Amendments has occurred in a
widespread series of incidents involving harsh discipline meted out to
students who engaged in gun-related speech in school. The Second
Amendment issue in elementary schools is not whether children may "keep
and bear [real] arms," but rather, whether school officials, by suppression of
certain speech, may create an atmosphere where the right to keep and bear
arms is disfavored and treated as a mere platitude. The question is whether
school officials are inculcating in children a prescribed view about guns,
and, if they are, whether that inculcation is unconstitutional.
B.H.,3 a sixth grader from Huntingtown, Maryland, was talking to his
friends during his bus ride home about a recent school shooting.' B.H. told

t Symposium Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 8. J.D. Candidate,
Liberty University School of Law (2014); B.A., Education, The Evergreen State College
(1991). With upmost gratitude, I thank my mother and my daughter for their support and
encouragement in my law school endeavors, including this article.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.").
2. U.S. CONST. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.").
3. The child's name is not given in the news story. The representative initials are based
on the father's name.
4. Martin Di Caro, WMAL Exclusive: 11-Yr-Old Suspended From Schoolfor Merely Talking
About Guns, WMAL (June 3, 2013), http://pro.wmal-af.tritonflex.com/common/
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his friends that he wished he had a gun to protect everyone and defeat the
bad guy.' As B.H.'s father noted, B.H. just wanted to be a hero and protect
people.6 Although B.H. neither threatened nor bullied anyone, the bus
driver refused to deliver B.H. home and instead returned to the school and
hauled B.H. into the principal's office.' The principal purportedly told the
father that "if you say the word 'gun' in my school you are going to get
suspended for ten days."' B.H. was given a ten-day suspension.9
K.G.,o a 5-year-old girl from Mount Carmel, Pennsylvania, was
suspended for ten days for making a "terroristic threat."" The "threat"
concerned a plastic bubble gun that spews bubbles when the trigger is
pulled.12 While waiting for the bus after school, K.G. remarked to another
student, who had a "princess" bubble gun at home, "I'll shoot you, you
shoot me, and we'll all play together."" The next day, the school issued a
ten-day suspension for a "terroristic threat.""
page.php?pt=WMAL+EXCLUSIVE%3A+11-Yr-Old+Suspended+From+School+For+Merely+
TALKING+About+Guns&id=26543&is corp=0.
5. Id.

6. Id. Although it may be difficult to imagine, heroism has been punished by at least
one school. In Fort Myers, Florida, a high school hero wrestled a loaded gun from another
student during the bus ride home. Jessica Chasmar, Student Suspendedfor Wrestling Loaded
Revolver Away from Gunman, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2013/mar/3/student-suspended-wrestling-loaded-revolver-away-g/.
Witnesses
confirm that the shooter pointed the gun point blank at another student and said he was
going to shoot him. Id. The hero believes that the victim would have been killed if the hero
had not acted. Id. The hero was suspended for being involved in an incident in which a
firearm was present. Id.
7. Di Caro, supra note 4.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. The child's name was not reported in the news story, and the initials are based on
the parent's name.
11. Meridith Edwards, Pennsylvaniagirl, 5, suspendedfor Talk of 'Shooting' a Hello Kitty
'Bubble Gun', CNN (January 22, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/21/us/pennsylvaniagirl-suspended. The school was unable to comment on the story because of federal privacy
rules, but the attorney representing K.G. and her family provided CNN with documents
related to the incident. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. A few days later the suspension was reduced to two days and the category
changed to "threat to harm others." Id. After the situation made national headlines and the
family retained an attorney, the suspension was dropped altogether. Bohman,School Board
Erases Suspension of Child with 'Hello Kitty' Gun, WNEP NEWS (January 30, 2013),
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N.A., like K.G., was suspended for talking about a plastic toy gun that
he had at home." N.A., a six-year-old in Pasco, Washington, told his
classmates about the Nerf guns his family purchased during a recent
vacation trip.'" An eavesdropping classmate told her teacher that N.A. had
a gun at school. 7 No gun, "toy or otherwise," was at the school, but N.A.
was suspended for merely talking about the Nerf guns with other
students." The school justified the suspension by claiming that the girl
who reported the gun conversation "felt her health and safety were
threatened.""
Schools promote an anti-gun atmosphere by treating the presence of toy
guns, or even "guns" made out of pastry, with the same harsh discipline as
real weapons. A ten-year-old boy in Alexandria, Virginia, who brought "a
cheap fake gun with an orange tip" on the school bus, was arrested,
fingerprinted, and charged with brandishing a weapon after a girl on the
bus told her mother that she was scared.20 A five-year-old boy near Boston,
Massachusetts used Lego blocks to create a toy in the shape of a gun during
an afterschool program, which resulted in a written warning that if he does
it again he can be suspended because a toy in the shape of a gun might be a

http://wnep.com/2013/01/30/school-board-erases-suspension-of-5-year-old-with-hellokitty-gun/. The girl's attorney confirmed that a subsequent agreement to expunge the
incident from the girl's record means that the girl will not sue the school district. The girl's
mother said she hoped the case was closed because she worries that a suspension involving
"terror threats" could threaten the child's future opportunities. Id.
15. Ty Beaver, Pasco School District Overturns6-year-old's Suspensionfor Discussing Toy
Gun, Tmu-CITY HERALD (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.tri-cityherald.com/2013/03/07/
2302285/pasco-school-district-overturns.html. The Tri-City Herald is a newspaper serving
the Southeastern area of Washington State.
16. Id. [Author: Nerf guns "shoot" soft foam rubber balls.]
17. Id.

18. Id.
19. Id. The parents challenged the suspension, noting that there is no provision in the
student discipline policy that prohibits talking about guns and there was no evidence that the
boy threatened anyone. Id. The Pasco School District eventually overturned the suspension,
but stated that there was "no plan to review current policy on the issue." Id. Although
relieved that his son's record will be cleared, N.A.'s father "plans to look into the issue"
because he believes "there's a lot to be said." Id. Of concern to the parents is the belief that
their son was singled out for discipline in the incident. Id.
20. Donna St George & Allison Klein, Charge Dropped against 10-Year-Old Who Canried
Toy Gun on School Bus, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/locall
charge-dropped-against-10-year-old-who-carried-toy-gun-on-school-bus/2013/02/26/87e0f8988024-11e2-a350-49866afab584_story.html.
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"scary experience" for his classmates.2 1 A seven-year-old boy in Anne
Arundel County, Maryland inadvertently nibbled his strawberry-filled
breakfast pastry into a shape that resembled a gun during a school-wide
breakfast program, and he was suspended for making "a threat to other
students" after he allegedly pointed his pastry and said, "Bang, bang."22 A
six-year-old boy from Palmer, Massachusetts, was sent to detention after he
brought his quarter-sized plastic toy gun on the bus, traumatizing other bus
riders when another student yelled that the boy had a gun.2 3 The mothers of
both children agreed that the school's reaction "send[s] the wrong message"
that small plastic toy guns and real guns are equally scary and dangerous.24
Similarly, schools send the "wrong message" when they fail to distinguish
between guns in the hands of "good guys" and those in the hands of "bad
guys." Two seven-year-old boys were suspended for pointing their pencils
at one another while playing "Marines."25 The school justified the
suspensions by noting that "a pencil is a weapon" and that some children
could consider imaginary guns as threatening.2 6 A batch of cupcakes
21. Todd Starnes, Child Faces Suspension for Making Lego Gun, Fox NEWS RADIO (Jan.
29, 2013), http://radio.foxnews.com/toddstarnes/top-stories/child-faces-suspension-formaking-lego-gun.html.
22. Donna St. George, Anne Arundel Second-GraderSuspended for Chewing His Pastry
into the Shape of a Gun, WASHINGTON POST (March 4, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/local/education/anne-arundel-second-grader-suspended-for-chewing-his-pastry-intothe-shape-of-a-gun/2013/03/04/44c4bbcc-84c4-1 1e2-98a3-b3db6b9ac586_story.html.
The
father, a "strong supporter of gun rights" suggests that the school's actions were "just a direct
result of society feeling that guns are evil and guns are bad." Id. The school wrote a letter to
parents assuring them that no students were in actual physical danger from the
inappropriate use of food, but that a counselor was available to help any traumatized
children talk through their anxiety. Id.
23. Toy Gun Causes Disturbanceon PalmerElementary School Bus, WGGB (May 24, 2013),
http://www.wggb.com/2013/05/24/toy-gun-causes-disturbance-on-palmer-elementary-schoolbus/
24. Id.
25. Anne McNamara, Boy Who Held PencilLike Gun Suspended, Fox 43 TV (June 17, 2013),
http://www.fox43tv.com/dpps/news/local/boy-who-held-pencil-like-gun-suspended_6109580.
26. Id. See also, Parents FuriousAfter Boys Suspended For Using Fingers as Guns, CBS
BALT. (Jan.
15, 2013), http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2013/01/15/parents-furious-afteryoung-boys-suspended-after-playing-with-imaginary-weapon/ (reporting on two six-yearolds suspended for playing cops and robbers at recess while using their fingers as guns);
Donna St. George, Record Clearedfor Prince William Boy Who Pointedfinger Like a Gun,
WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/recordcleared-for-prince-william-boy-who-pointed-finger-like-a-gun/2013/02/18/cdoc53a2-7al811e2-9a75-dab020l670da-story.html (detailing the suspension of a boy who pointed his
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brought to school decorated with plastic World War II soldiers to celebrate
a nine-year-old boy's birthday was rejected by the teacher because the
soldiers had guns." The principal defended the action, noting that the
school "walk[s] a delicate balance in teaching non-violence in [the school]
buildings and trying to ensure a safe, peaceful atmosphere," but the parent
suggests that comparing military heroes to deranged mass murderers was
carrying political correctness too far. 28 One might reasonably harbor the
suspicion that school discipline for gun-related speech is designed to
inculcate a distaste for all guns rather than merely protect students from
gun-related violence.
Passive, non-verbal, pro-gun expression has also come under fire. Jared,
an eighth-grader in West Virginia, engaged in quintessential political
speech when he wore a t-shirt to school with the National Rifle Association
logo, the picture of a hunting rifle, and the words "PROTECT YOUR
RIGHT." 29 While Jared stood in line at the cafeteria, a teacher saw the shirt
and demanded that Jared change it.30 When Jared refused, the teacher
pulled Jared out of line, in front of his classmates, and escorted him to the
principal's office where the school called the city police." Jared, isolated
from his classmates and confined to the principal's office, was trying to
explain that the shirt did not violate the dress code when the police
finger like a gun after another boy pretended to shoot him with a bow and arrow); Erica Ritz,
Second Grader Playing "Rescue the World" at Recess Suspended after Throwing Pretend
Grenade at "Evil Forces," THE BLAZE (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/
2013/02/05/second-grader-playing-rescue-the-world-at-recess-suspended-after-throwingpretend-grenade-at-evil-forces-with-adorable-interview/ (describing the suspension of a boy
for pretending to "save the world" by throwing an imaginary grenade at an imaginary box of
evil forces while playing alone at recess).
27. Todd Starnes, School Confiscates Cupcakes Decorated with Toy Soldiers, Fox NEWS
RADIo (Mar. 7, 2013), http://radio.foxnews.com/toddstarnes/top-stories/school-confiscatescupcakes-decorated-with-toy-soldiers.html.
28. Id. The principal noted that some parents don't allow any guns as toys and that
"living in a democratic society entails respect for opposing opinions." Id. The principal
apparently sees no inconsistency in failing to suggest that parents who ban guns as toys
should equally respect opposing opinions.
29. Charlo Green, Update: 8th Grader Suspended Over T-shirt Returns to School,
WOWK TV (May 6, 2013), http://www.wowktv.com/story/22041738/eighth-gradersuspended-over-t-shirt-returns-to-school-wv-logan-middle-school-jared-marcum; see also
infra Part III.A. (applying current jurisprudence to this incident).
30. Tiffany Madison, 14-year-old]aredMarcum Faces Jail,Finesfor NRA ShirtWASH. TiMEs
COMMUNrnES (June 18, 2013), http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/ citizenwarrior/2013/jun/18/suspended-wv-8th-grader-faces-jail-fines-nra-shirt/.
31. Id.
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arrived.32 The police officer reportedly told Jared to "sit down and be quiet,"
which Jared declined to do." Jared was arrested, removed from school in
hand-cuffs, and charged with obstruction." The obstruction charge was
later dismissed;35 however, Jared's treatment sends a clear and chilling
signal to other students that pro-gun speech is disfavored and will be met
with harsh, traumatic, and embarrassing discipline.
Similarly, an English teacher in a Texas high school assigned students in
his class to write a paper on any fun experience they had enjoyed over the
weekend." One student wrote about a trip to Cabella's sporting goods store
with his mom to buy a gun, and another student wrote about recently
attending the Fort Worth Gun Show." Both students were told they had to
choose a different topic and rewrite the assignment or receive a grade of
"zero."38 "Classmates reportedly laughed at the students after their papers
were rejected based solely on their subject matter."39 After the mother of
one of the students challenged the teacher regarding his bias towards guns
and posted the video on YouTube, the teacher accepted the papers and
apologized for misperceptions.40 But the students had already been
subjected to ridicule in front of their peers for choosing a pro-gun topic.

32. Id.

33. Id.
34. Id. Jared's step-father claims that when he came from work to pick up his child from
the police station the City police threatened to charge Jared with making "terroristic threats"
because of the t-shirt. Id. See also Charlo Greene, 14-year-old at the Center of "NRA T-Shirt
Controversy" Now Facing Possibility of 1 Year in Jail, WTRF (June 27, 2013),
http://www.wtrf.com/story/22587338/14-year-old-at-the-center-of-nra-t-shirt-controversynow-facing-possibility-of-1-year-in-jail
(quoting Jared's step father regarding the
obstruction charge, "Every aspect of this is just totally wrong.").
35. AP, Charge Dismissed againstAgainst W.Va. Middle School Student Who Refused to
Take Off NRA T-shirt, Fox NEWS, (June 28, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/06/28/
charge-dismissed-against-wva-middle-school-student-who-refused-to-take-off-nra.
36. Fil Alvarado, Teacher Refised to GradeReport on Guns, Mom Says, MYFoxDFW (Feb. 20,
2013),
http://www.myfoxdfw.com/story/21291400/teacher-refused-to-grade-report-on-gunsmom-says; Mike Opelka, Texas Teacher Reportedly Threatens to Give Students Zeros on
Homework Assignment for Writing About Guns, THE BLAZE (Feb. 21, 2013),
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/02/21/texas-teacher-threatens-to-give-students-zeros-onhomework-assignmet-for-writing-about-guns/.
37. Opelka, supra note 35.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.; Alvarado, supra note 35.
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* A father of a Connecticut student began suspecting that schools were
"trying to indoctrinate our kids" when he discovered that his son was taught
that the Second Amendment does not protect the right of Americans to
bear arms." In April of 2013, well after both District of Columbia v. Heller42
and McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill." were decided, students were given a
worksheet that stated, "[C]ourts have never found a law regulating the
private ownership of weapons unconstitutional."" The lesson further taught
that "[t]he judges and courts of each generation provide the interpretation
of the [Constitution]."" Attorney Mat Staver, founder of Liberty Counsel,
emphasized, "This idea that this school is propagating that the Constitution
can simply be changed at the whim of someone-or that the Second
Amendment does not protect the individual right to bear arms is absolute
propaganda and absolutely false.""
Some people have labeled incidents such as these as "outrageous,"17
"ridiculous"" and "just totally wrong,"" but others wonder if such
widespread incidents point to a deeper problem: the training of school
children to dislike guns. Gun-related speech takes on greater significance
because the keeping and bearing of arms is itself a protected constitutional
41. Todd Starnes, School: Americans Don't Have Right to Bear Arms, Fox NEWS RADIO
(Apr. 9, 2013), http://radio.foxnews.com/toddstarnes/top-stories/school-americans-donthave-right-to-bear-arms.html.
42. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
43. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
44. Starnes, supra note 40. The worksheet further stated, "The courts have consistently
determined that the Second Amendment does not ensure each individual the right to bear
arms .

. ..

So a person has no right to complain about a Second Amendment violation by

state laws." Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Bohman, supra note 14.
48. ParentsFuriousAfter Boys Suspended For Using Fingers as Guns, CBS BALT. (Jan. 15,
2013) (reporting on two six-year-olds suspended for playing cops and robbers at recess while
using their fingers as guns), http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2013/01/15/parents-furious-afteryoung-boys-suspended-after-playing-with-imaginary-weapon/.
49. Greene, supra note 29; see also Peter Kasperowicz, GOP Bill Would Defund Schools
with Rules Against Playing with Imaginary Guns, THE HILL (July 10, 2013, 9:10 AM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/310079 (reporting H.R. 2625 which would block
federal funds to any school that punishes students for carrying miniature guns, eating food
into the shape of a gun, using fingers as guns, or wearing clothing supporting the Second
Amendment because these punishments "are only teaching students to be afraid of
inanimate objects that are shaped like guns") (internal quotation marks omitted).
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right. The Supreme Court has warned that schools must not teach children
to regard as mere platitudes the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights."
The issue is further inflamed by passionate beliefs held on the many sides of
the gun control debate in the wake of highly publicized school shootings."
Schools have a responsibility to protect the children within their care, but
the Supreme Court has warned that school officials may not prescribe what
shall be orthodox beliefs. Part II discusses the current Constitutional
balance, as established by the Supreme Court, between the child's right to
free speech protection and the school's need for control and order. Part III
applies the current jurisprudence to the incidents introduced supra and
suggests that current jurisprudence does not adequately protect children
from the inculcation of government-imposed beliefs. Part IV suggests that
protecting children's "freedom of the mind" is best accomplished by
increasing parental choice in schools through a universal voucher program.
II. FREE SPEECH VERSUS SCHOOL CONTROL
The First Amendment restrains the federal government from abridging
the free speech of citizens." The Supreme Court has held that the Free
Speech Clause is incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment against
the states and their political subdivisions, including school boards.53
Further, "First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and
students."5 Unfortunately, the Court's analysis of when the "special
characteristics of the school environment" should outweigh First
Amendment protection-or whether and when the First Amendment
should apply at all-has not been clear.ss

50. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
51. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e live in a time
when school violence is an unfortunate reality that educators must confront on an all too
frequent basis. The recent spate of school shootings have put our nation on edge and have
focused attention on what school officials, law enforcement and others can do or could have
done to prevent these kinds of tragedies. After Columbine, Thurston, Santee and other
school shootings, questions have been asked about how teachers or administrators could
have missed telltale 'warning signs.'").
52. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 3.
53. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624,637 (1943).
54. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
55. Morse, 551 U.S. at 404.
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A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District: The
Seminal Case
Depending on one's view of students' speech rights, Tinkers" either
established First Amendment protection for student speech17 or it "effected
a sea change in students' speech rights, extending them well beyond
traditional bounds."" Either way, courts look to Tinker as the baseline from
which to adjudicate school speech cases. 9 But it was West Virginia State
Board of Eductation v. Barnette"o that laid the foundation for Tinker.
Barnette, in turn, was an extension of the clarification of parental rights in
Meyer v. Nebraska' and Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of
Jesus and Mary.62
1. Meyer and Pierce
A cultural movement toward "progressive" ideas of free government-run
schools had taken root by the early twentieth century and parents had lost
much of their power in making educational choices for their children.63 In
1923, the Meyer Court addressed a Nebraska statute, upheld by the
Nebraska Supreme Court, that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages
to children younger than the eighth grade." The stated purpose of the
statute was to correct the "baneful effects" of allowing recent immigrants to
"rear and educate their children in the language of their native land."6 The
state also argued that a child's comparatively small daily capacity for
learning must be carefully managed by the Legislature so that the proper

56. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
57. Morse, 551 U.S. at 403.
58. Id. at 416, (Thomas, J., concurring).
59. See, e.g., H. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 2d 392, 401 (E.D. Pa. 2011) ("If
school speech does not fit within one of these exceptions, it may be prohibited only if it
would substantially disrupt school operations [under Tinker]."). This is the most common
interpretation of the Supreme Court's holdings, and has been adopted by at least eight
circuits. Griggs ex rel. Griggs v. Fort Wayne Sch. Bd., 359 F. Supp. 2d 731, 740 (N.D. Ind.
2005).
60. W. Va. State Bd of Educ. v. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
61. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
62. Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
63. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
64. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397.
65. Id. at 397-98.
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topics for study are selected.' The actual goal of the Legislature was to
create a homogenous people who would all think in the same native
language and thus have the same civic development.67 The Court recognized
this as the ideology advocated by Plato and exemplified by Ancient Sparta,
where the State, not parents, made the educational decisions necessary to
produce "ideal citizens."6 8
Our Nation, in contrast, has not chosen that system. 69 The Meyer Court
acknowledged that parents have a natural duty, and a corresponding right
of control, to ensure that their children are educated-a duty and right that
cannot be infringed.o Consequently, the Court viewed the Legislature's ban
on foreign language instruction as interference with the power of parents to
control the education of their own children.7 ' The decision of the Nebraska
Supreme Court was properly reversed.
Meyer contains two subtle but important principles. First, a state may
compel attendance at some school, but the choices of how that education is
accomplished must rest with the parent. 72 Second, a state nevertheless has
more power to dictate curriculum in state-run schools." These two
principles were implicated again, two years later, in Pierce. The issue in
Piercewas the constitutionality of Oregon's statute to require all school-age
children to attend a public school-thereby eliminating a choice by parents
to send their children to a religious private school." In contrast to the
Meyer Court's acknowledgment of state control of curriculum in state-run
schools, the Pierce Court acknowledged the undisputed power of the state to
regulate, inspect, supervise, and examine all schools-public and private.
Nevertheless, the Court rejected the theory that states may "standardize its

66. Id. at 398.
67. Id. at 398, 401-02.
68. Id. at 401-02 (noting that Sparta's method of submerging the individual and
developing ideal citizens was to remove children from their parents at the age of seven and
entrust them to the care of the State). See also infra text accompanying notes 230-33.
69. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
70. Id. at 399, 400-01.
71. Id. at 401.
72. Id. at 403.
73. Id. at 402 (reasoning that the state government has power to compel).
74. Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 530,
532 (1925).
75. Id. at 534.
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children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."76
"The child is not the mere creature of the state ....

"n

Once again, the Court

denied as unconstitutional a state's attempt to establish a state-dictated
orthodoxy and recognized parental choice as the guardian of liberty. While
Meyer and Pierce affirmed parental decision-making authority over
educational decisions, it also affirmed the power of government officials to
set educational requirements. Barnette enunciated a limit to that power.
2.

Barnette

In the two decades between Pierce and Barnette, the nation endured a
World War for the second time in a generation. West Virginia passed a
statute requiring all school children to affirm their Pledge of Allegiance
daily to the United States flag. Parents subscribing to the Jehovah Witness
teachings refused to allow their children to swear allegiance with a stiffarmed salute7 1 to a flag, objecting that such an act was forbidden by God's
commands in the Bible."0 The issue for the Barnette Court was who must
prevail when the desire of the parents to inculcate firmly held beliefs
conflicts with the desire of the state to establish curriculum requirements.
The Barnette Court began by distinguishing between what is taught as
information, such as instruction in what the Pledge of Allegiance says and
means, and what is taught to foster a belief or opinion, such as requiring the
student to actually declare allegiance." The Court reasoned that a school
district may require children to be instructed in this Nation's patriotic
elements, but school officials cross the line when they bring the coercive
power of government to bear on students who refuse to act in accordance
with a particular belief.82 Barnette ended with Justice Jackson's often-quoted
ideal: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
76. Id. at 535.
77. Id.
78. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,626 (1943).
79. Id. at 626. The stiff-arm salute was so similar to Hitler's "Nazi-Fascist" salute that
various groups complained, and the salute was adjusted to require the palm to face upward
instead of downward. Id. at 627-28 & n.3.
80. Id. at 629.
81. Id. at 631.
82. Id. The coercion was severe. Students not willing to swear to the flag were excluded
from school and considered truant. Parents were thereby threatened with fines and jail and
students were threatened with incarceration in juvenile detention facilities maintained for
juvenile criminals. Id. at 630.
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nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein."83
Barnette's attempt to distinguish between inculcation of secular, neutral
knowledge and inculcation of partisan beliefs in pursuit of uniformity is an
ideal rather than a practical possibility. Although the Court warned that
"officially disciplined uniformity" results in a "disappointing and disastrous
end," the Court nevertheless failed to recognize that when school boards
and teachers operate as government officials, every discretionary decision
regarding content of curriculum or method of instruction will necessarily
be an attempt by "official[s], [both] high and petty, [to] prescribe what shall
be orthodox in . . . matters of opinion."" Or, perhaps, the Court did

recognize that very danger and created for the first time a trigger,
ideological though it may be, upon which a student's constitutional rights
would be judicially protected.
In early American schools, constitutional protections were no more
appropriate to the schoolroom than to the living room because teachers
were agents of the parent in transmitting community-approved knowledge
and values."' Parents protected the minds of their children by choosing
which educator to employ or declining to use the local school at all. As free
government-run schools became the norm and teacher pay and
employment became attenuated from parental satisfaction, parents lost the
ability to protect their children from coercive government-created ideology.
The vulnerability of children is even more pronounced where parents are
compelled to send their children to school and have no realistic alternative
to the government-run institution." Barnette creates the judiciary as
defender of children's fundamental rights where parents are no longer able
to protect their children from the coercive power of the government.
Barnette promises to protect "from all official control" the "sphere of
intellect and spirit.""
83. Id. at 642.
84. Id. at 637, 642.
85. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
86. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring); Barnette, 319
U.S. at 626-27 (noting that the stiff-armed Pledge was required by statute in every school,
including private, parochial, and denominational schools). Significantly, the Court
distinguished the plaintiffs situation from that of students choosing to attend a university or
serve in the military. Id. at 631-32. Choice is once again the antidote to coercion.
87. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. The Court's attempt to protect the freedom of the mind is
more ideological than principled. The Court essentially creates a judicial balancing test
whereby government officials, from teachers to federal bureaucrats, may prescribe what shall
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3. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
The year was 1966 and the balance between freedom of expression and
disturbance of school discipline had become an unsettled legal issue. The
Tinker" children decided, with their parents' support, to wear black
armbands in protest of the involvement of the United States in the Vietnam
hostilities." In a preemptive move, the school district adopted a policy
forbidding the armbands, and the Tinker plaintiffs were suspended when
they wore the armbands anyway." The plaintiffs sued, arguing that the
school violated their First Amendment rights." The same year, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that wearing a political symbol could not be
prohibited "unless it 'materially and substantially interfere[s] with the
requirements of appropriate discipline of the school."'92 The Tinker district
court declined to follow the Fifth Circuit's test of material and substantial
interference with school discipline and instead looked to the authority of
the school. Although admitting that "the wearing of an armband for the
purpose of expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act that is within
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment," the District Court upheld
the school's authority to proscribe the armbands because of a reasonable
fear of disturbance." An equally divided en banc Court of Appeals affirmed
without opinion.94
The Supreme Court rejected the "reasonable fear of disturbance"
standard, declaring that "in our system, undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to

be inculcated in school children, but if the officials go too far, according to the judgment of
the court, then the court will intervene. Based on jurisdictional principles, however, the
solution to protecting the freedom of the mind is not to introduce judicial balancing tests but
rather to restore to parents the ability to protect their own children, through educational
choice. See discussion infra Part V.
88. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
89. Id. at 504, 516 (Black, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 504.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 505 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)). The Fifth Circuit
upheld the school's prohibition of "freedom buttons" because those students who wore the
buttons harassed students who did not, creating a disturbance in the educational setting. Id.
at 505 n.1 (internal citation omitted).
93. Id. at 505, 508.
94. Id.
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freedom of expression."" The Court adopted the Fifth Circuit's test and
held:
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able
to show that its action was caused by something more than a
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where
there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the
forbidden conduct would 'materially and substantially interfere
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school,' the prohibition cannot be sustained. 6
In rejecting a "reasonable fear" standard, the Court warned that
proscription based on a mere apprehension of disturbance would threaten
to quash free expression because "[a]ny word spoken, in class, in the
lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another
person may start an argument or cause a disturbance," and thus be
proscribable." Allowing freedom of expression risks some disturbance,
"[b]ut our Constitution says we must take this risk, [because] ... it is this
sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of openness-that is the basis of our
national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who
grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society."98
Although schools bear responsibility for the education, safety, and wellbeing of the students in their care, school officials may not regard students
as "closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to
communicate. They may not be confined to the expression of those
sentiments that are officially approved."9 9 The Court reasoned that
"[s]chool officials do not possess absolute authority over their students"
because state-operated schools bear the same restrictions as other branches
of the government.'o The Court instructed that the Constitutional
freedoms of students must be "scrupulous[1y] protect[ed]."o' Schools must
not "strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 508.
Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)).
Id. at 508.
Id. at 508-09 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 511.
Id.
Id. at 507.
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important principles of our government as mere platitudes."l 02 The Court
emphatically rejected the notion that students "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."' 03
In summary, the traditional interpretation of Tinker states that student
expression may not be suppressed unless school officials reasonably
conclude that it will "materially and substantially disrupt the work and
discipline of the school."1* But a jurisdictional question lurks in the
shadows of the opinion-whether education is the jurisdiction of the
parent or the school. Tinker has often been framed as a case involving
student political speech,'o but the true underlying conflict, as in Barnette,is
between the parent's right to inculcate deeply held beliefs even when those
beliefs conflict with the school's interest in establishing rules. The Majority
notes in passing that the decision to wear black armbands in protest was not
a spontaneous or ill-conceived decision.0 6 Rather, it was a group of adults,
including the Tinker children's parents, who decided to fast and to wear
black armbands for two weeks to symbolize their objections to the Vietnam
hostilities.o' The children and their parents had engaged in similar activities
before, and the children decided to participate in this event with their
family.' The children were suspended until they were willing to return
without the armbands, which they did after the two-week period was
over."' Further, Justice Black began his dissent by attacking the credibility
of the parents. He called the Tinker children's father a "Methodist minister
without a church" and noted that he drew a salary from the American

102. Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
103. Id. at 506. In spite of the Court's strong language of protection for the "free mind" of
youth, the Court indicated that if the school regulation had involved the "length of skirts or
the type of clothing,... [or] hair style, or deportment" rather than black armbands, then the
"scrupulous[ly] protect[ed]" fundamental rights would have succumbed to the school's
dictates. Id. at 507-08.
104. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,403 (2007).
105. See, e.g., Morse, 551 U.S. at 403 (describing the Tinker speech as political speech and
the "core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect"). Indeed, the dissent derided
the students because they had been sent to school at taxpayer expense to learn what was
being taught, not to "talk politics" and "broadcast political" views. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 522-23
(Black, J., dissenting).
106. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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Friends Service Committee,"o a Quaker organization devoted to the pacifist
pursuit of peace and justice."' Justice Black further noted that the mother of
"[a]nother student who defied the school order and insisted on wearing an
armband in school" was an official in the Women's International Peace and
Freedom organization." 2 Justice Black did not use these facts in his
rationale and appears to have noted them solely as a way to prejudice the
reader against the parents by exposing their political views. The underlying
issue of this case, then, is not whether children have the right to political
speech in school, but whether children have the right to participate in a
passive political activity with their family even if that activity spills over into
the school. It is the issue of whether parents properly have the jurisdiction
to teach their children political views and opinions, just as Barnette dealt
with religious beliefs, or whether schools should hold the superior authority
to pass judgment on which views and opinions are proper for the school
setting.
The Tinker Court's rationale takes on even greater significance when
applied to student speech about guns. The right to own and carry a gun,
along with the underlying right to use the gun in defense of self or others, is
a Constitutional right granted to American citizens."' Nevertheless, the
issues surrounding gun ownership and gun regulation evoke strong
emotion among adults. The underlying jurisdictional issue is whether
parents or the school should determine what view of guns is transmitted to
students.
B. The Role of Schools Post-Tinker
The Tinker decision is not without controversy. One sitting Supreme
Court Justice has bluntly stated that the Tinker standard is "without basis in
the Constitution," and, given the opportunity, he would overturn it.114 The
Court has decided several subsequent cases involving student Free Speech
rights and school authority. Depending on one's view, these cases either
110. Id. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting).
111. About AFSC, Who We Are, AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMIT-rEE,
http://afsc.org/about (last visited Dec. 17, 2013).
112. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting).
113. See U.S. CONsT. amend. II; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008);
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010).
114. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410-11, 422 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In
my view, the history of public education suggests that the First Amendment, as originally
understood, does not protect student speech in public schools.").
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"scale back""' and "further erode"ll 6 Tinker's First Amendment protections
or carve out small, defined exceptions to the strong protections."'
1. Bethel School DistrictNo. 403 v. Fraser:The Lewd Sexual Content
Exception
In Fraser,"' a high school student was suspended for giving a speech with
lewd sexual content during an assembly."" In the two decades between
Tinker and Fraser, the Court adopted a different view of the role and
purpose of public school. While Tinker emphasized the individual liberty
and fundamental rights afforded each American citizen and the school's
role in preparing students to exercise those rights responsibly, Fraser
emphasized civility.
The Fraser Court framed public education as a way to inculcate "habits
and manners of civility" because these "fundamental values" are "necessary
to the maintenance of a democratic political system." 2 0 While
acknowledging the "freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views
in schools and classrooms," the Court championed "society's countervailing
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior."' 2 ' Thus, while Tinker emphasized the need for vigorous debate
and exposure of children to diverse opinions, Fraseremphasized the need
for considerable deference to the sensibilities of others and the
promulgation and inculcation of "shared values."l 22 In this way, the Fraser
Court seems to embrace what the Tinker Court rejected-the Sparta-like
role of schools in creating a homogenous populous.' 3 Fraser assigned to
teachers and older students the duty to "demonstrate [to younger students]
115. Id. at 417 (Thomas, J., concurring).
116. T.A. v. McSwain Union Elementary Sch., No. 1:08-CV-01986, 2010 WL 2803658, at
*4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2010).
117. Newsom ex rel. Newsom v. Albemarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 256 (4th Cir.
2003).
118. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
119. Id. at 680.
120. Id. at 681. The Court further noted that the democratic political system "requires
consideration for the personal sensibilities of the other participants and audiences." Id. In
the Fraser Court's estimation, it is public school's role to teach the "shared values of a
civilized social order." Id. at 683.
121. Id. at 681.
122. Id. at 683 ("The schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the essential
lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent,
or offensive speech and conduct. . . .").
123. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511-12 (1969).
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the appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their
conduct and deportment in and out of class," and equated teachers and
other students with parents as proper role models for children.'24 While the
Court ascribed to "schools, as instruments of the state," the duty to
"educat[e] our youth for citizenship," it also appealed to the in loco parentis
rationale.125 Because parents would act to protect their children "from
exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech," school authorities
must act on the parents' behalf.1 26
Rather than forge a new role for public schools-that of civility monitors
and guardians of the sensibilities of others, Justice Brennan advocated
applying the Tinker test to the Fraser facts.1 27 Justice Brennan concurred
because he found the Plaintiffs language to be disruptive and therefore
proscribable under Tinker.'28 Justice Marshall agreed with Justice Brennan's
Tinker test but dissented because the school failed to show there was any
disruption.'29 In weighing Fraser's speech rights against the school's need
for discipline, two Justices applied the same test and got opposite results.
The "mode of analysis employed in Fraser is not entirely clear""' because
the Court acknowledged the First Amendment Free Speech rights of
students and yet granted to school boards the right to determine what
speech may be censored."' Although the result in Fraser was correct,
ambiguity in the rationale arises because the Court did not address the
fundamental question of whether schools, as instruments of the state, or
parents should determine what values should be transmitted to children.
2. Hazelwood School Districtv. Kuhlmeier: The Imprimatur Exception
Two years after Fraser,the Court again addressed the issue of student
speech, and again left the Tinker test on the shelf 3l 2 In Kuhlmeier, students
124. Fraser,478 U.S. at 683 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 683-84.
126. Id. at 684. In loco parentis today is not analogous to the common law doctrine
because rather than choosing a school official to stand in their place, parents are forced to
send their children to public schools where government officials, rather than the parents,
determine what are the important lessons to learn. See discussion infra Part IV.
127. Fraser,478 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
130. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007).
131. Id.
132. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988) ("[W]e conclude
that the standard articulated in Tinker for determining when a school may punish student
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brought suit after the school authorities refused to allow two articles to be
published in the school newspaper."' The district court found no First
Amendment violation, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.'34
The court began by finding that the school newspaper was a public forum
because it was designed to allow the expression of student viewpoints."'
The Eighth Circuit then applied Tinker, concluding that in the absence of
material and substantial interference with school work, discipline, or the
rights of others, the school unconstitutionally suppressed the student's
speech.' 36 The Supreme Court reversed, distinguishing between a student's
right to expression, which was the question addressed in Tinker, and a
student's right to have the school affirmatively promote that speech in a
publication bearing the imprimatur of the school.'37 Basing its rationale on
Fraser instead of Tinker, the Court recognized a right of school officials to
determine what speech is appropriate for a school setting-whether
assembly, classroom, or school newspaper-and to disassociate the school
from any speech deemed improper.' Further, the Kuhlmeier Court
reasoned that a "school must also retain the authority to refuse to sponsor
student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or
alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with the
shared values of a civilized social order.""' The Court's holding was
ambiguous.o and granted to government equal responsibility with parents
to educate the Nation's youth."'
expression need not also be the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend
its name and resources to the dissemination of student expression.").
133. Id. at 263.
134. Id. at-65.
135. Id. at 269.
136. Id. at 265.
137. Id. at 271-73.
138. Id. at 266-67.
139. Id. at 272 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Id. (holding that educators may censor the "style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns" but giving little guidance on what actions are reasonable
and what pedagogical concerns are legitimate).
141. Id. ("[Tlhe education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents,
teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges.") (emphasis added).
Further, the Court declared that "judicial intervention to protect students' constitutional
rights" is required only when the school's censorship of a "vehicle of student expression has
no valid educational purpose." Id.
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Although Justice Brennan's dissent noted the "supremely subjective
choices" that the public educator regularly makes, he accepted that the
public educator is tasked with nurturing "students' social and moral
development by transmitting to them an official dogma of community
values."l4 2 Further, Justice Brennan appealed to Barnettem3 and Tinker'" to
argue that "public educators must accommodate some student expression
even if it offends them or offers views or values that contradict those the
school wishes to inculcate."' Justice Brennan advocated granting to school
officials a jurisdiction over children that is co-extensive with parents, but at
the same time attempted to restrain that authority through constitutional
limits. The tension between a public school as the "inculcat[or] of its own
perception of community values"1" and a public school subject to the
constitutional limits on suppression of student speech is at the heart of
many gun speech incidents.
3. Morse v. Frederick:The School Message Exception
The ideological battle between student expression and school discipline
4
surfaced once again in the Court's fractured opinion in Morse.1
1 In 2002,
the Olympic Torch passed through Juneau, Alaska on its way to Salt Lake
City for the Winter games.'4 8 The local high school released students from
school so they could watch the Coca-Cola sponsored event.149 Joseph
Frederick arrived on the scene after school had been dismissed and joined
the mixed crowd of students and non-students across the street from the
142. Id. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ("strangle the free mind at
its source").
144. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("[students
do not] shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.").
145. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 280.
146. Id. at 280 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion.
Although four justices joined the Chief Justice, three of them authored or joined concurring
opinions. Justice Breyer filed a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 425.
148. Id. at 397; Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006) rev'd and
remanded,551 U.S. 393 (2007) and vacated, 499 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2007).
149. Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1115, 1119-20. Students who got bored with the festivities
were free to leave. Although the school designated the event as an "approved social event or
class trip," students did not have to obtain permission from their parents to attend, as
normally required. Coca-cola passed out mini-bottles of soda, which the students threw at
one another. Id. at 1116.
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school.' As the news cameras passed, following the torch, Frederick and
his friends unfurled a banner that stated "BONG HITS 4 JESUS."' The
school principal crossed the streetl 5 2 demanded that they take the sign
down, snatched and crumpled the sign, and then suspended Frederick.1 53
After an unsuccessful appeal of the suspension to the school board,
Frederick sued the school district and the principal for violation of his First
Amendment right to free speech.'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Frederick. The Ninth
Circuit discerned three categories of speech in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence: plainly offensive speech subject to Fraser,school-sponsored
speech subject to Kuhlmeier, and all other speech subject to Tinker.'
Finding the speech to fall under the last category, the Appeals Court upheld
Frederick's right to expression because the speech had caused no
disturbance of the educational process.5 "
The Supreme Court reversed. Although the holding narrowly gives
schools the authority to "safeguard those entrusted to their care from
speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use,"'
the Court's rationale gives schools broad authority to suppress speech.
Acknowledging that the slogan on the banner was "cryptic," the Court
nevertheless based its decision on the "reasonable" interpretation of the
slogan by the principal.' In a stretch, the Court perceived that the banner

150. Id. at 1116. Since Frederick had not yet set foot on school property on that day and
classes had been dismissed, Frederick was arguably not "in school" when the incident
occurred. See id.
151. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397.
152. Frederick and his friends were standing across Glacier Avenue from the school on a
public sidewalk and not on school property. Frederick,439 F.3d at 1116.
153. Id. at 1115-16; Morse 551 U.S. at 396.
154. Morse, 551 U.S. at 398-99.
155. Frederick,439 F.3d at 1121.
156. Id. at 1123. The court notes that there was disturbance, but it was from the throwing
of soda bottles and snowballs. Id. at 1115. Further, the court noted that the banner "was
displayed outside the classroom, across the street from the school, during a non-curricular
activity that was only partially supervised by school officials. It most certainly did not
interfere with the school's basic educational mission." Id. at 1123.
157. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. The school district described its "basic educational mission"
as "promot[ing] a healthy, drug-free life style." Frederick,439 F.3d at 1116.
158. Morse, 551 U.S. at 401. Frederick himself steadfastly maintained that the words were
chosen merely as "nonsense" to get the attention of television cameras and were never
intended to convey a pro-illegal drug message. Id.
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could have been interpreted as an imperative.'" The Court distinguished
the political speech in Tinker, which is "the core of what the First
Amendment is designed to protect," and instead focused on the
"compelling interest" of deterring drug use by school children." The Court
noted that "Congress has declared that part of a school's job is educating
students about the dangers of illegal drug use."' 61 In contrast to the
Majority's emphasis on a school board's duty to act in the role of a parent
by protecting children from dangerous messages, the dissent harkened back
to Tinker's restraint on governmental suppression of speech.
Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg,
expressed concern that the Court's ruling would spawn broad
infringement of rights. Justice Stevens noted that government
censorship based on viewpoint discrimination is subject to "the most
rigorous" scrutiny, yet the Majority's "test invites stark viewpoint
discrimination."' 62 Justice Stevens warned that the Majority's holding
strikes at the "bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment"that speech may not be censored merely because the listener disagrees.' 63
Nevertheless, the Majority rejected foundational First Amendment
doctrine because of the "unusual importance of protecting children from
the scourge of drugs."'"
159. Id. at 402. ("First, the phrase could be interpreted as an imperative: '[Take] bong hits
.. '-a message equivalent, as Morse explained in her declaration, to 'smoke marijuana' or
'use an illegal drug.' Alternatively, the phrase could be viewed as celebrating drug use'bong hits [are a good thing],' or '[we take] bong hits'-and we discern no meaningful
distinction between celebrating illegal drug use in the midst of fellow students and outright
advocacy or promotion.").
160. Id. at 403, 407 (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. Id. at 408. It further noted that Congress has provided billions of dollars to schools,
but that the funding is contingent on the schools adopting a "clear and consistent [anti-drug]
message." Id. The Court was apparently untroubled that the First Amendment rights of
students were sacrificed in the face of evidence that the "clear and consistent" anti-drug
message of schools has been an abject failure and that illegal drug use in schools has
substantially increased. Id. at 407 (noting that "evidence suggests that [the illegal drug
problem in school] has only grown worse").
162. Id. at 436-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 437-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 438 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Adding a twist of irony to the Morse opinion
is the question of whether a sign in Alaska alluding to marijuana use refers to "illegal"
drug use at all. Since the district court and the appeals court decided the case under the
"disruption" standard of Tinker, neither court addressed whether marijuana can be
considered an illegal drug. The appeals court made reference to the possible political
nature of the sign because of the ongoing political debate surrounding marijuana
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Morse went beyond granting to schools authority to refuse to sponsor
student speech advocating disfavored messages as the Kuhimeier Court did.
Morse grants schools the jurisdiction to eliminate disfavored messages.'65
Since Tinker, every time the Court has heard a school speech case, it has
sided with the school. Although the Court may, indeed, be creating so many
exceptions that the speech protections for students are illusory, the lower
courts have interpreted Morse to be just another narrow exception to
Tinker.'66 In sum, a school may constitutionally
prohibit speech that is (1) lewd, vulgar, or profane [under
Fraser];(2) school-sponsored speech on the basis of a legitimate
pedagogical concern [under Kuhlmeier]; and (3) speech that
advocates illegal drug use [under Morse]. If school speech does
not fit within one of these exceptions, it may be prohibited only
if it would substantially disrupt school operations [under
Tinker].'

possession. Frederick,439 F.3d at 1119 ("Also, it is not so easy to distinguish speech
about marijuana from political speech in the context of a state where references
regarding marijuana legalization repeatedly occur and a controversial state court
decision on the topic had recently issued."). In 1975, the Alaska Supreme Court held
that the state constitution's privacy clause protects the possession and use of marijuana
in one's own home. Noy v. State of Alaska, 83 P.3d 545, 545 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003)
(citing Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975). A subsequent statute enacted by
voters in 1990 to make all possession of marijuana illegal was also ruled
unconstitutional. Id. at 545-46. Even more, then, the Morse Court upheld censorship of
student speech that advocated, if anything, behavior that is legal, at least for adults in
their own homes, merely because it contradicted the school's "message."
165. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 438 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. DePinto v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 514 F. Supp. 2d 633, 639 (D.N.J. 2007) ("The
Supreme Court's recent holding in Morse v. Frederick, does not change this basic
framework, or the applicable analyses for the trio. Instead, Morse adds a third exception
to Tinker, allowing a school to censor speech that is 'reasonably viewed as promoting
illegal drug use."' (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
167. H. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 2d 392, 401 (E.D. Pa. 2011). This is
the most common interpretation of the Supreme Court's holdings, and has been
adopted by at least eight circuits. Griggs ex rel. Griggs v. Fort Wayne Sch. Bd., 359 F.
Supp. 2d 731, 740 (N.D. Ind. 2005). The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, has
adopted Kuhlmeier as the default standard, emphasizing the school's authority as
schoolmaster to limit speech that does not occur within a public forum. Id.
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III. APPLICATION OF CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE TO GUN-RELATED
SPEECH INCIDENTS

A. Expression of PoliticalOpinions
Jared's arrest for wearing an NRA t-shirt gained national attention.1 8
The divergent reactions to the story mirror the dual perspectives advocated
by the Court. A short article on an MSN-affiliated website cited the news
story and claimed that "controversy erupted" when Jared, a kid "who
insensitively wore an NRA shirt with a firearm motif to his school in Logan,
W.Va., right after the spate of school shootings," refused to change the
shirt. 6 ' The article's emphasis on "insensitivity" and "controversy" are
reminiscent of the Fraser and Kuhlmeier Courts' similar emphasis on
civility. In contrast, commentators from Outdoor Life emphasized Jared's
exercise of "his First Amendment right to free speech" and sharply
criticized the school's failure to applaud Jared's "understanding [of] how the
Bill of Rights and Constitution are supposed to work.""o This view
resembles the Tinker Court's view of the role of public educators.
Several circuits have addressed the use of t-shirts as tools of First
Amendment expression in the public school forum. In 2003, the Fourth
Circuit heard the case of Alan Newsom's NRA t-shirt, which featured three
silhouettes of men holding firearms superimposed over the caption "NRA
Shooting Sports Camp.""' In spite of the clear indication that the logo
referred to "Shooting Sports," Elizabeth Pitt, an assistant vice-principal who
saw the shirt in the lunch room, said that she "had the immediate
impression that the figures were 'sharpshooters' which reminded her of the
shootings at Columbine High School in Colorado and other incidents of
school-related violence."1 7 2 Pitt demanded that Alan turn the t-shirt inside
out, contending that the shirt was inappropriate because it showed "pictures

168. See discussion supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of
Jared's NRA t-shirt incident).
169. NRA Gun T-shirt Teen Might Do a Year in Fashion Prison, MSN Now (June 16,
2013), http://now.msn.com/jared-marcum-nra-shirt-teen-faces-jail.
170. John Haughey, 14-Year-Old JaredMarcum Now Faces Criminal Chargesfor NRA TShirt, OUTDOOR LIFE (June 18, 2013), http://www.outdoorlife.com/blogs/gunshots/2013/06/14-year-old-jared-marcum-now-faces-criminal-charges-nra-t-shirt.
171. Newsom ex rel. Newsom v. Albemarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 252 (4th Cir.
2003).
172. Id.
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of men shooting guns."' Alan, who had never had discipline problems in
school, initially resisted but submitted after being warned that refusal would
be considered "defiance." 7
At the time of the t-shirt incident, the school dress policy in no way
prohibited depictions of "weapons" on t-shirts. 7 However, over the
summer, the school district revised the dress code to prohibit messages on
clothing that relate to weapons, thereby equating messages related to
"weapons" with messages related to drugs, alcohol, vulgarity, and racism."'
The federal district court denied Alan's request for a preliminary
injunction, opining that even if the shirt was symbolic speech, the school
had the authority to ban the shirt because the school "only sought to
suppress the form of the message (graphic description of gunmen) and not
the message itself."' 77 Thus, the district court used the reasoning of Fraser,
expanding its holding that approved of a ban on lewd sexual speech to
include a ban on any form of expression deemed inappropriate by the
school. "

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, advancing a narrower
interpretation of Fraser. Although acknowledging the Fraser Court's
statements that "certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject
to sanctions" and that the determination of what constitutes inappropriate
speech "properly rests with the school board,""' the Fourth Circuit
described Fraser's holding as a narrow exception to Tinker's disruption
requirement. "Under Fraser, the banned school speech need not meet
Tinker's disruption requirement; rather, speech in school can be banned if it
is lewd, vulgar, indecent, or plainly offensive.""'o Because the silhouette
image on Alan's shirt was not lewd, vulgar, indecent, or offensive, and
because there was no danger that an observer would believe the image bore
173. Id. at 253. Pitt later contended that it "had the potential to disrupt the instructional
process," was "distracting," and conflicted with the school's message that "Guns and School
Don't Mix." Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. ("During the summer of 2002, the student/parent handbook was revised to
prohibit students from wearing, inter alia, 'messages on clothing, jewelry, and personal
belongings that relate to drugs, alcohol, tobacco, weapons, violence, sex, vulgarity, or that
reflect adversely upon persons because of their race or ethnic group.'").
177. Id. at 254 (parenthetical in original).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 256.
180. Id.
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the imprimatur of the school under the Kuhlmeier test, the court upheld
under the Tinker standard Alan's right to wear the shirt.'
Similarly, a federal district court in Indiana held that the high school was
permitted to ban "symbols of violence," but not Michael's t-shirt supporting
the Marines.182 The t-shirt depicted a picture of an MI6 rifle, which is the
standard weapon of a Marine, and a stanza of the Marine's Code, including
the phrases "I must shoot straighter than my enemy who is trying to kill me.
I must shoot him before he shoots me."183 Michael wore the shirt to show
support for the Marines, but the school officials forbid him to wear the shirt
again because it was "inappropriate for the educational setting." 84 Michael's
father gave him permission to wear the shirt again because he believed that
the prohibition was an infringement of Michael's right to show patriotic
support for the Marines.18 The next day Michael was again told to turn the
shirt inside out; when he refused, he was sent to the in-school suspension
room to await his father's arrival.'16 Ironically, the room in which he waited
had a poster of a Marine carrying the same rifle shown on Michael's shirt. 8 1
Michael sought an injunction allowing him to wear the shirt. 8
Acknowledging that a general prohibition on wearing depictions of
symbols of violence is a reasonable way to address school violence, the court
nevertheless distinguished between symbols of violence and firearms in a
military context.8 9 Significantly, the court noted the School Board's

181. Id. at 257, 260-61. Under Tinker, censorship was found inappropriate because there
was no evidence that any depiction of any weapon had ever caused a disruption. Id. at 259.
The court noted that the broad ban on all images "related to" weapons would reach
nonviolent, nonthreatening symbols of important organizations-including the spear on
Virginia's State Seal, the sabers on the University of Virginia's athletic logo, and the musket
on school logo of the high school located across the school. Id. at 259-60. The court noted
with irony that a shirt bearing the school's message of "Guns and School Don't Mix" would
be "related to" weapons and thereby banned. Id. The court vacated, remanded, and
instructed the lower court to apply the Tinker standard. Id. at 261.
182. Griggs ex rel. Griggs v. Fort Wayne Sch. Bd., 359 F. Supp. 2d 731, 732-33 (N.D. Ind.
2005).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 733.
185. Id. at 734.
186. Id. at 734-35.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 733.
189. Id. at 744.
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repeated mischaracterization of the shirt in court documents.190 The court
emphasized that the soldier's words depicted in the creed relate to "only
violence perpetrated by the Marines against America's enemies" and not
general violence by the soldier or the student who wore the shirt.'9 The
court noted that the school's argument that the depiction of a firearm is, by
itself, offensive "does not hold water" because a poster hanging in the room
where the student was sent for punishment shows a Marine holding a rifle
identical to the one on the student's t-shirt.1 92
Cutting to the heart of the matter, the court discerned that the issue was
not the message of the t-shirt but the school official's personal feelings
about guns. The court noted the principal's "personal objection" to guns,
suggesting that this general attitude caused a negative reaction to the tshirt.19 3 The court used the First Amendment to protect Michael against the
school's attempt to disseminate an anti-gun bias.
Political speech, like Jared's encouraging others to "Protect Your [Second
Amendment] Right" and Michael's support of the military, would appear to
be protected under Tinker, but the First Amendment protection depends on
how courts choose to define the issue. Courts would undoubtedly uphold a
school board regulation that bans all words and pictures on t-shirts as a
permissible content-neutral dress policy.'9 Additionally, Justice Alito noted

190. Id. at 743. The School District stated in Memoranda that Michael's shirt contained
an "obsessive tone and pledge to preemptively kill one's enemies" and implied that Michael
was referring to his own enemies. Id. at 744. The court rejected the mischaracterizations,
noting the clear context of the shirt. Id.
191. Id. at 744.
192. Id. at 745. The line between "symbols of violence" and military emblems is
sometimes difficult to discern for those that have an anti-gun disposition. In Genoa, Illinois,
an eighth-grade teacher demanded that a student turn his t-shirt inside out because it
depicted crossed rifles under the word "Marines." Joshua Rhett Miller, Father Wants School
Dress Code Changed After Son Asked to Remove Marines T-Shirt, Fox NEWS (Feb. 27, 2013),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/02/26/father-wants-school-dress-code-changed-after-sonasked-to-remove-marines-t/%20-%20ixzz2WFqPitzD.
After being threatened with
suspension, the child complied. The Genoa-Kingston Superintendent emphasized that the
shirt was not in violation of the school's dress code and the demand by the teacher was
incorrect. Id. The Superintendent lamented that it was "disheartening" that the incident had
happened because the schools in the district actively support local military families with
special events and letter-writing projects. Id.
193. Griggs,359 F. Supp. 2d at 744.
194. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1969)
(differentiating "pure speech" from such things as "the length of skirts"); see also Griggs, 359
F. Supp. 2d at 742 (suggesting that if Michael's t-shirt had featured the M16 only then it
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that the term "educational mission" can be manipulated by school officials
to advance political and social views.' For example, the school district in
Morse supported its suppression of student speech by defining its "basic
educational mission" as "promot[ing] a healthy, drug-free life style.""' In
the same way, Fraser's rationale that "certain modes of expression are
inappropriate and subject to sanctions" and that the determination of what
constitutes inappropriate speech "properly rests with the school board" can
be used by courts as a basis for finding that certain restrictions do not have
to meet Tinker's standards. Finally, Justice Thomas has bluntly advocated
overruling Tinker,'" and the Court has limited Tinker's reach in every postTinker challenge.
B. ProtectingPrivateSpeech
B.H., K.G., and N.A. were each engaged in private conversation with
their friends outside of the classroom setting and were disciplined merely
for using the words "gun" and "shoot."" The question is whether the
private speech was constitutionally protected from government censorship
under current jurisprudence. 9 9 None of the speech involved lewd sexual
probably would not have constituted "speech" and the First Amendment would not have
been implicated).
195. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 423 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito
rejects the "educational mission" argument but notes that it was advanced in Morse. Id.
196. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006). Notably, the "basic
educational mission" involves a value judgment on what constitutes a proper lifestyle and
has nothing to do with the acquisition of basic knowledge and skills. It is easy to envision the
same argument being used by a school to justify suppressing gun-related speech to
encourage a lifestyle free of gun violence. Such a scenario is even more likely when the
federal government has pushed the lifestyle by tying grants to promotion of the message it
desire-as occurred in Morse. See infra text accompanying note 261 (noting the current
administration's anti-gun violence grants).
197. Morse, 551 U.S. at 410, 422 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he standard set forth in
[Tinker] is without basis in the Constitution.... I think the better approach is to dispense
with Tinker altogether, and given the opportunity, I would do so.").
198. See discussion supra notes 3-19 and accompanying text.
199. As a preliminary matter, none of these incidents fall into the unprotected categories
of "true threats" or "fighting words." To qualify as a "true threat," the speaker must intend to
communicate a serious intention "to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals." Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). The friendly
chatter between these classmates did not demonstrate any intent to commit an unlawful act
of violence. Similarly, the children's speech does not qualify as "fighting words." Fighting
words must "have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom,
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content, so Fraser does not apply. None of the speech could have been
construed as bearing the imprimatur of the school, so Kuhimeier does not
apply. None of the speech related to illegal drugs, so Morse does not apply.
Therefore, Tinker should apply. Tinker protects the rights of elementaryschool children just as it does their secondary-school counterparts.2 00
Concededly, however, extending Tinker protections to elementary-age
students does not necessarily mean that speech rights of young children are
co-extensive with those of older children.20 ' The school may prohibit speech
under Tinker only if it "materially and substantially interfere[s] with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,"202 but
which speech causes interference with the operation of a school or
classroom and which speech infringes on the rights of others, may look
different in an elementary school than in a secondary school.203

individually, the remark is addressed." Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972). In none
of these cases was there any evidence that the comments caused any violent reaction. On the
contrary, in each case, the comments were directed to friends of the speaker.
200. Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 385-86 (5th Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2740 (U.S. 2012) ("[T]he student-speech rights announced in Tinker inhere in the
elementary-school context."). The Fifth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court upheld the
First Amendment right of elementary-aged children not to speak in Barnette. Id. at 386. The
court further noted that the Supreme Court upheld the First Amendment free speech rights
of young children outside of the school context in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n,
131 S.Ct. 2729 (2011), which upheld the right of children to purchase violent video games
without parental permission. Id. at 375 n.27.
201. Morgan, 659 F.3d at 386.
In affirming that Tinker-based speech rights apply to elementary students, we
must be mindful of a long-established countervailing principle: in public
schools, the speech appropriate for eighteen-year-old high school students is
not necessarily acceptable for seven-year-old grammar school students. Indeed,
common sense dictates that a 7-year-old is not a 13-year-old[,] and neither is
an adult. In other words, to extend Tinker's protections to public elementary
schools is not necessarily to hold that the speech rights of elementary students
are coextensive with those of older students.
Id. at 387 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also noted that
elementary students might be more susceptible to coercion and peer pressure and unable "to
filter the potentially hurtful words of their classmates or walk away from speech that bothers
or offends them." Id.
202. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
203. Morgan, 659 F.3d at 387 (acknowledging that elementary students may not be able
to distinguish fact from fiction, process serious issues on their own, or filter harmful words
of classmates). -
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Nevertheless, "there is no reason that the Tinker framework cannot
accommodate this concern."204
In a case "involv[ing] private speech governed by Tinker" in an
elementary school setting, the Fifth Circuit looked to whether the incident
occurred in a structured educational setting, whether the other students
were willing participants and friends, whether the content of the speech was
age-inappropriate, and whether there was any indication of disruption.205
None of incidents described supra involving B.H., K.G., and N.A. occurred
in a structured educational setting. In each of the incidents, the child was
talking to close friends who were participating willingly in the discussions.
Nothing indicates that the words used and ideas conveyed were not ageappropriate. Finally, there was no evidence in any of these incidents that the
spoken words caused a substantial disturbance of school operations.2 06
Under the Tinker standard, the subjection of the students to disfavor and
discipline due to their speech, which portrayed guns in a positive light
rather than something to fear and dislike, appears to be a clear First
Amendment violation of each child's speech.
On the other hand, school officials can make several arguments to
support their authority to regulate student speech in these situations. First,
although the majority of federal appeals courts view Tinker as the default
test for school speech, the Supreme Court has consistently stressed the
political nature of the Tinker speech. The Court distinguished the political
speech of Tinker from the non-political speech in Fraser20 ' and Morse.20 8
The Court's reticence to uphold Tinker as a test in the absence of political
204. Id.
205. Id. at 387-88 (finding that the elementary school violated a child's free speech rights
to distribute "Jesus loves me" pencils to her friends while waiting for the bus after school).
206. A similar lack of factors supporting suppression of expression is notable in the
incidents related to the use of Lego blocks, see supra note 21, the creation of toaster pastry
shapes, see supra note 22, and the use of imaginary weapons to play consensual games at
recess, see supra note 26.
207. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986) (noting the "marked
distinction between the political 'message' of the armbands in Tinker" and the sexual content
of speech in issue).
208. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) ("But not even Frederick argues that
the banner conveys any sort of political or religious message."). Even the superintendent in
Morse acknowledged that if the sign regarding illegal drugs had been clearly political,
advocating legalization of medical marijuana for instance, then the outcome likely would
have been different. Id. at 398. See also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272
(1988) (reasoning that in spite of political content of the speech, schools must have authority
to refuse to support the speech).
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speech may indicate that if the Court were to issue a coherent and complete
framework for school speech that Fraseror Kuhlmeier, rather than Tinker,
would be the default. This is the minority view of the Seventh Circuit. 209 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, likewise, applied a Fraser-Kuhimeier
reasoning to the case of a kindergarten student who was suspended for
saying "I'm going to shoot you" during a consensual game of "guns" at
recess. 21 0 The court adopted from Fraser the principle that "'it is a highly
appropriate function of public school education to prohibit vulgar and
offensive terms in public discourse' and that the 'determination of what
manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate
properly rests with the school board.' 2 1 ' Further, the court culled from
Kuhlmeier the principle that a "school need not tolerate student speech that
is inconsistent with its basic educational mission, even though the
government could not censor similar speech outside the school."2 12 The
court labeled as "tenuous" the argument that the children's speech is
protected because "[t]here is nothing in the record that even suggests that
A.G. and his schoolmates playing cops and robbers were making a political
statement about the value of guns in school." 2 13
Even under Tinker, school officials might prevail. Tinker supports
restrictions by school officials if the speech involved creates a substantial
disruption or infringes on the rights of others. Schools often have to deal
with true verbal threats involving gun-speech.214 One method of addressing
those serious threats is to ban all gun-related "threats"-even if the "threat"
is obviously made in jest or in play. Although Tinker prohibits restriction of
209. Griggs ex rel. Griggs v. Fort Wayne Sch. Bd., 359 F. Supp. 2d 731, 740 (N.D. Ind.
2005). Although eight circuits have adopted Tinker as the default, the Seventh Circuit applies
the Kuhlmeier test to all student speech in a nonpublic forum, regardless of whether it could
conceivably bear the imprimatur of the school. Id. The school may thereby dictate what
speech is appropriate in all aspects of the educational setting. Id.
210. S.G. ex rel. A.G. v. Sayreville Bd. of Educ., 333 F.3d 417, 421 (2003).
211. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683).
212. Id. at 422 (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
213. Id. Additionally, the court pointed out that none of the speech involved in Tinker
and its progeny involved kindergarten students. Id. at 423. The court noted that both the
Third Circuit and the Seventh Circuit have discussed the necessity of taking the age and
maturity of the student into account when rendering First Amendment decisions. Id. In
concluding, the court held that the speech restriction on the kindergarten playmates was a
"legitimate decision related to reasonable pedagogical concerns"-using phraseology from
Kuhlmeier-and that "the determination of what manner of speech is inappropriate
properly rests with the school officials"-using phraseology from Fraser.Id.
214. Id. The school involved had dealt with three incidents. Id. at 418.
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speech based solely on an undifferentiated apprehension that certain speech
might provoke a substantial disruption, the Supreme Court might justify a
viewpoint-neutral ban on all gun-related speech by applying the rationale of
Morse and concluding that school districts must "safeguard those entrusted
to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging
[violence]."215

Further, school officials can often point to students who are purportedly
afraid as justification for limiting the speech of others. This flows from
Fraser's emphasis on civility and concern for the sensibilities of others. A
school official in Suffolk, Virginia asserts that children today are scared
about shootings in school and in the community.2 16 She said, "Kids don't
think about 'Cowboys and Indians' anymore, they think about drive-by
shootings and murders and everything they see on television news every
day.""' Students' fear may very well be driven by the school's policy on
imaginary guns. The suspension of N.A., for example, was justified by the
school in part by the teacher's statement that the girl who reported the
incident felt that her health and safety were threatened when she overheard
the conversation about the Nerf guns, which were at home.21 8 Her
sensibilities were taken seriously even though it is irrational to fear for one's
safety because of an overheard conversation about plastic toys that shoot
foam rubber balls.
In summary, Tinker likely provides very little protection for the excited
conversations of school children about newly acquired plastic gun-shaped
toys or the schoolyard expressions of young children seeking to capture the
imaginary bad guy or to save the world. Under the current system, school
officials have authority to control the environment and decide what is
appropriate. In spite of that control, some children are purportedly
frightened at the presence of imaginary guns,219 while others are
traumatized by the harsh discipline resulting from their gun-related
215. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
216. McNamara, supra note 25.
217. Id.
218. Beaver, supra note 15. One wonders if the girl would be better served if the school
explained to her that private speech about toy Nerf guns does not actually threaten her
health and safety.
219. See, e.g., S.G., 333 F.3d at 419 (noting that the teacher said students in the vicinity
were "frightened and upset" when they saw kindergarten boys pretending to shoot each
other with their fingers); St. George, supra note 20 (describing a ten-year-old boy who was
arrested and charged after a girl reported seeing his plastic toy gun on the bus and told her
mother that she was "scared").
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speech. 22 0 The very act of censoring words like "gun" and "shoot" sends a
message to young children that these words are the equivalent of swear
words or other disfavored speech. The ban thereby establishes an orthodox
view within the school about guns.
C. ProtectingStudent Opinions in the Classroom
Gun-related speech in the context of school assignments has even less
protection from content discrimination than other speech. The two Texas
high school students threatened with a "zero" grade for mentioning guns,
despite directions to write about any topic, gained a reversal by the teacher
after one parent confronted the teacher and posted the confrontation on
YouTube.221 Case law suggests that they would not have fared so well in
court.
Courts have upheld the broad authority of the school officials to define
an educational mission and create rules that reasonably accomplish the
mission.222 A rational basis standard requires "only that the educational
purpose behind the speech suppression be valid," not that it survive a

220. B.H. "was very scared at the fact that he was interviewed by the principal and a
sheriffs deputy" without a parent present. Di Caro, supra note 4. Sonya Kumar, an ACLU
staff attorney, labeled the suspension inappropriate and suggested that the school's proper
response to the child's angst about a recent school shooting "should have been [to] assurle]
him that they were going to take steps to keep all students safe, not [to] punish[] him." Id.
K.G. was very upset at being suspended for offering to play with bubbles, see supra note 10,
and her mother reminded her every day that "she's a good girl and she's done nothing
wrong." Bohman, supra note 11. A ten-year-old was arrested, fingerprinted, and charged
with brandishing a weapon after he brought a "cheap fake gun with an orange tip" on the
school bus. St. George, supra note 20. The public defender warned that facing criminal
charges "really affects the child" and criticized the fact that it took three weeks to get the
charges dropped. Id. A five-year-old uncharacteristically wet his pants after school officials
interrogated him for two solid hours without his parents present when he was found in the
possession of a plastic cap gun. Donna St. George, Cowboy-style Cap Gun Gets 5-Year-Old
Suspended From School in Calvert County, WASHINGTON POST (May 30, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/cowboy-style-cap-gun-gets-5-year-old93
ousted-from-school-in-calvert-county/2013/05/30/a3a8al78-c c-11e2-9245773c0 123c027_story.html.
221. Alvarado, supra note 36; Opelka, supra note 36.
222. Curry ex rel. Curry v. Hensiner, 513 F.3d 570, 578 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Blau v. Fort
Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 393 (6th Cir.2005)) (applying Kuhlmeier to uphold the
school's censorship of a student's religiously themed Christmas ornaments where students
were assigned to create, manufacture, and sell any homemade product at the school's
Classroom City event).
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balancing test with the child's First Amendment rights.22 3 Rather, under
Kuhlmeier, educators have complete editorial and content control of
student curriculum-related expression in order to ensure that the activity
teaches what it is supposed to teach.224 Further, a classroom teacher has
complete authority to forbid a disfavored topic, even if the teacher
mistakenly instructs the students that they may choose any topic.225 "So
long as the teacher limits speech or grades speech in the classroom in the
name of learning and not as a pretext for punishing the student for her race,
gender, economic class, religion or political persuasion, the federal courts

should not interfere." 226
IV. AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ESTABLISHMENT OF ORTHODOXY

The Meyer, Pierce, Barnette,and Tinker Courts emphatically warned that
schools must not attempt to create standardized children or impose a
government-created orthodoxy." Fraser and Kuhlmeier revealed a shift in
the Court's thinking toward the use of schools to inculcate "shared
community values." 228 Morse revealed a further shift, extending power to
school officials to suppress speech that conflicts with the school's, rather

223. Id. at 579.
224. Id. at 577.
225. See Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist, 677 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding
the suspension of a student when he wrote that he wished a missile would destroy the school
and kill the teachers, after the teacher assured students that they could write any "wish"
including those related to missiles). The court reasoned that the school is in the best position
to assess dangers of student speech and it was not for courts to set aside the decisions of
school officials even if the decisions are lacking in wisdom or compassion. Id. at 113.
226. Settle v. Dickson Cnty. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155 (6th Cir. 1995) (upholding a
teacher's decision not to accept a research paper on Jesus, although accepting papers on nonChristian religious topics, where the student failed to get preapproval of the topic as
required). The court noted that teachers in classrooms, like judges in courtrooms, may
frequently make mistakes, but it is the teacher's responsibility to set criteria and judge
student work. Id. at 155-56. Judge Batchelder rejected the application of First Amendment
speech rights to the classroom, noting that
when a teacher makes an assignment, even if she does it poorly, the student has
no constitutional right to do something other than that assignment and receive
credit for it. It is not necessary to try to cram this situation into the framework
of constitutional precedent, because there is no constitutional question.
Id. at 158 (Batchelder, J., concurring in result only).
227. See discussion supra Part II.A.
228. See discussion supra Part II.B.1, 2.
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than community's, message.22 9 When government officials, rather than
parents, take the primary responsibility and authority for teaching children
values and opinions, then Justice Jackson's "fixed star" no longer operates to
guide First Amendment jurisprudence.2 30 One's view of who bears
responsibility to educate the child determines whether suppression of gunrelated speech is a permissible inculcation of shared community values or
an impermissible indoctrination of government-taught orthodoxy.
A. Competing Ideologies
Courts have relied on education ideologies to support their rationales.
The American system of education has been contrasted with Sparta's
educational system on the one hand and compared to common law
doctrines like in loco parentis on the other. This section provides a very
brief discussion of educational ideology in order to put the Court's
comments in context.
Ancient Sparta viewed parents as having no responsibility or rights at all.
In Sparta, children were considered assets of the State, and Sparta adopted
an educational program where children were removed from the influence of
their parents and systematically trained by government officials to be "ideal
citizens" according to the approved standard.231 Sparta accomplished its
educational objective by removing children from their parents at the age of
seven and entrusting them to the care of the State.2 32 Individuality was
discouraged.233
This Nation rejected the Sparta-like relationship between the State and
its people and chose instead a relationship where individuals are trusted to
make wise choices after a robust exchange of ideas.234 In early America,
229. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
230. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). See also
discussion supra Part II.A.2.
231. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969).
232. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,401-02 (1923).
233. Id. ("[T]he wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be
common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent. * * * The proper
officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there they will
deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of the
inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some
mysterious, unknown place, as they should be." (quoting Plato's Ideal Commonwealth)).
234. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)). The American ideology borrowed from the Ancient Hebrew educational
philosophy, which was the antithesis of the Spartan view. Hebrew parents were commanded
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education beyond what the parents could transmit was accomplished
primarily by private schools and tutors, who had great incentive to teach the
values and views held by the paying parents.2 ' Nevertheless, the early
colonists believed that the community bore some responsibility to subsidize
the tuition of poor families so that all children could receive a basic
education. Perhaps the earliest example of American public school creation
and funding is the 1647 "Ye Olde Deluder Satan Act," passed by the
Massachusetts Commonwealth, requiring each township to establish a
public school governed by a publicly representative board of laymen.2 36 In
spite of public funds used for education, however, the training of children
was viewed as "[o]ne of the most sacred duties of parents," and teachers
acted only as a "substitute of the parent" to accomplish "delegated duties."237

to train their children by constant interaction within the family structure. Deuteronomy 6:7.
Children were commanded to listen and heed the instruction of their parents. Proverbs 1:8.
The responsibility for educating children fell to the parents. Proverbs 22:6; Ephesians6:4.
235. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 411 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). These
educators were literally in loco parentis,acting as agents of the parents hired to provide an
education consistent with parental expectations. Under English common law, an educator
thus employed had a legal right through the doctrine of in loco parentis to demand strict and
unquestioning obedience. Id. at 413. Under this system of education, parents had the
broadest possible control in determining what was taught because the educator served at the
pleasure of the parents.
236. James W. Guthrie, American Education Reform: What is Needed is "National"Not
Federal, 17 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 125, 132-33 (1997). The public school educator was
endowed, through in loco parentis, with the same iron-fisted discipline authority that the
private school tutor had enjoyed. Morse, 551 U.S. at 411-12 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In
short, in the earliest public schools, teachers taught, and students listened. Teachers
commanded, and students obeyed. Teachers did not rely solely on the power of ideas to
persuade; they relied on discipline to maintain order.").
237. Morse, 551 U.S. at 413-14 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting State
v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365, 365-366 (1837). America's approach to the education of poor
children developed differently from that in England. A century after the 1647 public school
act in the Massachusetts Commonwealth, Sir William Blackstone wrote his commentary on
English law. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (1753). Blackstone recognized as a
principle of natural law the duty of parents to provide, protect, and educate their children.
According to Blackstone, not only will parents instinctually and naturally care for their
children, but they are obligated to do so by the fact that they voluntarily created the life. Id.
*447. The duty to provide an education "suitable to their station" was deemed "[by] far the
greatest importance of any" of the duties. Id. *540. To grow up without education was to
grow up without a means of support, "like a mere beast, to lead a life useless to others and
shameful to himself." Id. *541. Blackstone faulted the civil law of most countries for not
imposing strict sanctions on parents who failed to provide a proper education for their
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American colonies, and later the states, funded schools for poor children
through a combination of local taxes and tuition.3 Significantly, all funds
raised through tuition and taxes paid the salary of the teacher; buildings and
furnishings were paid for exclusively with gifts. 239 As a result, early schools
maintained strong connections among the parents, the community, and the
teacher. The teacher's employment was directly connected to parental
satisfaction. Parents who did not agree with the teaching style, discipline, or
values could choose not to send the child to school. Because the educator
was an agent of the parent and not the government, the government did not
determine values.
In summary, protection from government censorship was hard to find in
early American schools, but it was not needed because parents directed the
education of their children. The teacher in early America was not a
government official but rather an employee or agent of the parents and
community. The local community subsidized poor families through
voluntary taxation. Teachers were "at will" employees who could be easily
fired for poor performance but had complete authority in the classroom
under the doctrine of in loco parentis.
1. Progressive Ideas
In 1647, when "Ye Olde Deluder Satan Act" was passed, the townships
had authority for permissive taxation only-the towns people had to agree
to pay taxes to fund the school. 24 0 In 1827, the Commonwealth passed a law
making school funding compulsory.2 4' By the early 1900's, general tax
revenue provided over 80% of many common schools, and other

children. Id. Blackstone lauded the English practice of taking children away from poor
parents to be raised and trained in apprenticeships by rich families. Id.
238.

FLETCHER HARPER SwiFT, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC PERMANENT COMMON SCHOOL FUNDS

IN THE UNITED STATES, 1795-1905 at 28 (1911), available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/

cgi/pt?id=loc.ark:/13960/tIvd7jq0n;view=1up;seq=33. In 1658, the colonial town of
Weathersfield voted to hire a teacher who was to be paid through collecting tuition from the
students who attended, with the remainder being raised by a property tax. Id. Plymouth used
the inverse approach, laying a tax of twelve pounds on each inhabitant and then requiring
families with children attending the school to make up the difference. Id. at 29. The
Connecticut Code of 1650 required that every township in the commonwealth with fifty
households maintain a school but allowed the township the option of funding the school
through tuition or through taxes. Id.
239. Id. at 30.
240. Id. at 3-4.
241. Id..
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government funding generally provided the rest.24 2 As the funding structure
changed, so did the attitudes about public schools. As the government took
more and more in the form of taxes and promised more and more in the
form of benefits, the "progressive" notion of universal "free" education took
hold, and the connection between what a family paid for the education of its
children and the salary of the teacher became attenuated.24 3
Another indicator of this progressive change was the rise of compulsory
attendance at school. By 1918, every state had exerted its "police power" to
compel school attendance, even over the objection of parents.2" This view
of child custody asserted that a child's education was not a matter of private
family concern, but rather that the State had the authority to dictate both
attendance at a school and the prescribed curriculum.245 Furthermore,
parents lost power in educational decision-making because of extensive
consolidation of school districts. In 1939, there were 117,000 public school
districts in the United States; in 2009, there were less than 14,000.246 The
shift to consolidated school districts run by the government has changed
teachers from being agents acting on behalf of the parents to being "agents

of the State." 24 7

In summary, in the early twentieth century, parents accepted-albeit
"gradually and in the face of bitter opposition"-the principles that "the
responsibility of educating the child rests upon the state and not alone upon
the parent" and that all citizens should fund the schools through property
tax regardless of whether they have children in the school. 248 As a result,

242. Id. at 19.
243. Id. at 4. In early America, families were often reluctant to send their children to free
schools because of the stigma attached to receiving "free" education. The Constitution of
Georgia, for example, provided for free public education funded by the State. Id.
Communities "often rejected with contempt [the funds offered by the state for free schools]
owing to the stigma of the badge of pauperism attached to receiving it." Id. During the
nineteenth century, the same attitude prevailed throughout much of the United States. Id.
244. Guthrie, supra note 236, at 329-330 (noting that Massachusetts enacted the first
compulsory attendance law in 1852).
245. Id.
246. Number of Public and Private Elementary and Secondary Schools: Selected Years,
1869-70 through 2009-2010, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, DIGEST OF
EDUCATION
STATISTICS
(2011),
available at
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/

d 11/tables/dt 11091 .asp.
247. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,424 (2007) (Alito concurring).
248. SwIFT, supra note 238, at 3.
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today's parents "realistically, have no choice but to send their children to a
public school and little ability to influence what occurs in the school." 249
B. Government Inculcation of Opinionsand Values
The progressive principle that the state, and not the parent, bears the
responsibility of educating children introduces a new meaning for in loco
parentis. Instead of "in the place of the parent" as an agent, the state takes
the role of a substitute parent. This allows the government to dictate what is
orthodox and desirable in the creation of future citizens. Both Pierce and
Meyer warned against the "standardization of children," yet neither
questioned the State's authority to require attendance at a school and to
require that a certain curriculum be taught. 2S0 If the curriculum is essentially
the same, the difference between schools is the worldview from which the
curriculum is taught. It is in this realm of worldview that the battle for the
minds of children takes place.
1. Freedom of the Mind
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison were vocal opponents of using tax
money to propagate opinions.2 51 In Jefferson's preamble to the Act for
Establishing Religious Freedom, he maintained that government officials
have no authority in the realm of ideas and opinions.252 Jefferson viewed
using the coercive taxing power of the state to disseminate governmentapproved opinions as "sinful and tyrannical."25 3 Madison agreed that

249. Morse, 551 U.S. at 424 (Alito concurring).
250. Jeffrey Shulman, The Parent as (Mere) Educational Trustee: Whose Education is it,
Anyway?, 89 NEB. L. REv. 290, 292 (2010) (discussing Meyer and Pierce). By the time of
Pierce, in 1925, law professor William Guthrie was warning that use by the state
governments of public schools to indoctrinate children was the same tactic used by
communist Russia. Id. (quoting Brief for William D. Guthrie & Bernard Hershkopf as Amici
Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-in-Error at 3, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (No. 325)).
Nevertheless, the Court merely acknowledged that parents could add to the state-required
curriculum and could provide education for their children at a private school and did not
question the state's right to compel attendance or control curriculum. Id. at 339. Meyer and
Pierce improperly ceded too much power to school officials, and the view that government
has the authority to compel school and control the curriculum has been widely accepted for
eighty years.
251. Herbert W. Titus, No Taxation or Subsidization: Two Indispensable Principles of
Freedom ofReligion, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 505, 507 (1992).
252. Id. at 510.
253. Id. at 511.
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government coercion in the realm of opinions and beliefs violated the law
of nature because God created the mind to be free to seek, worship, and
obey God in whatever manner the individual believed to be true and
right.2 5 Because the institutions of the church and school were intertwined
in early America, Jefferson and Madison argued that government officials
should not have authority, involvement, or taxing power in either the
church or school.2 55
Arguably, the early educational systems of private, non-governmental
teachers hired and paid for through voluntary taxes and tuition restrained
the coercive power of government. Parents typically delegated to the public
educator the teaching of "English Language, English Grammar, Arithmetic,
and Mathematics."256 Such subjects involve little opinion or moral value
judgments. 257 The parents thereby relegated to the educator the teaching of
knowledge and kept for themselves the inculcation of morals and beliefs.
The local community held authority to quickly address incompetent
teaching or inculcation of aberrant community values-the parents could
refrain from sending their children to the school and the community could
decline renewal of the teacher's yearly contact. That authority no longer
exists.258
2. Government as Purveyor of Ideas
In contrast to private educators, public sector teachers, hired by other
governmental officials and paid for through compulsory taxation to
254. See id. at 507.
255. Id. at 511. This is in contrast to the view of states like Massachusetts that saw a role
for state government in both areas. Id. The First Amendment adopted the Virginia view for
the federal government, but the restriction did not apply to the states prior to incorporation
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 511-12; see id. at 512-13 (discussing the hypocrisy
of advocating public schools in the name of "peace, good order, and well-being of society"
while denying public religion on the same grounds).
256. SWIFT, supra note 238, at 24. Mathematics is the general science of numbers and
their operation and includes specific branches such as geometry, calculus, and arithmetic,
which refers solely to addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division of non-negative real
numbers. Diference Between Math and Arithmetic, Math Forum, Drexel University
(11/06/2001 21:57:04), http://mathforum.org/library/drmath/view/52282.html (last visited
Aug. 3, 2013).
257. Concededly, any instruction conveys values. The mere fact that reading, writing, and
arithmetic are taught conveys an endorsement of the value of those subjects. Nevertheless,
there can be no legitimate difference of opinion on the correct answer to "2+3" or the correct
spelling of "pumpkin."
258. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing parents' loss of authority).

2014]

DON'T SAY "GUN"

791

inculcate a state-approved curriculum, destroy the "freedom of the mind"
that Madison and Jefferson advocated.2 9
The public school teacher is just as much a civil magistrate as is a
police officer or a judge. The teacher is employed by the local
school board, paid out of local and state tax revenues, and
expected to teach according to state and local government policy;
namely, to inculcate the fundamental values necessary to
maintain a democratic political system and to prepare students
for participation as citizens in that system. 26 0
All education requires indoctrination; the only question is whether that
indoctrination will be controlled by parents or by government officials. 26'
As government has taken the responsibility and authority to educate
children, the fundamental values necessary have expanded from grammar,
writing, and arithmetic to social issues. A glimmer of expansion, and the
Court's embracing of it, is seen in.Morse, where the Court acknowledged
that "Congress has declared that part of a school's job is educating students
about the dangers of illegal drug use" and that schools receiving funds
under certain federal programs must "certify that their drug-prevention
programs convey a clear and consistent message that the illegal use of drugs
is wrong and harmful." 262 The anti-illegal drug message is just one example
of government officials using tax dollars to establish in schools an orthodox
message related solely to values and opinion and not related to basic
academic knowledge.
The government uses tax dollars to implement its gun-related views in
the same way. In 1994, Congress enacted the Improving America's Schools
Act,263 which included a statutory requirement that each state receiving
federal funds under any title of the Act include in its disciplinary policy a
mandatory one year expulsion for any student who possessed a firearm at

259. Titus, supra note 251, at 515.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 514.
262. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007) (internal quotation marks, citation, and
alteration omitted). Arguably, the school's reaction to the "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" sign was as
much to prove that the school conveys a "clear and consistent message" on illegal drug use,
and thus to protect its federal funds, as to prevent the student from expressing a pro-drug
message.
263. The Gun-Free Schools Act (GFSA), which was enacted on October 20, 1994 was part
of the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994. 20 U.S.C, § 7151 (2006).
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school. 2" The federal government thus sought to influence by the use of tax
money school discipline policies related to firearms. In 2012, the
Department of Education promoted its program to "protect schools and
communities by reducing gun violence." 265 It offered $112 million in grants
to schools that implement programs, collect data, and adopt discipline
policies with which the Department agrees. 266 Like the anti-illegal drug
funds in Morse, 6 7 federal funds can be used to promote anti-gun policies
and influence how an administrator deals with gun-related incidents.
3. Lack of Parental Control
Under current jurisprudence parents have no authority over what is
taught to their children in public school, even if the instruction is
completely inconsistent with the strongly held moral or religious beliefs of
the family.268 The First Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that the Barnette
Court drew a fine distinction between inculcation of values by instruction,
which is permissible, and inculcation through compelled statements of
belief, which is not permissible.269 Schools are a means by which a child's
beliefs may be severed from those of the child's parents and conformed to
those of society. 270 Under this rationale, requiring students to draw pictures
or write a paper supporting gun control or to read books with an anti-gun

264. Id.
265. Reducing School and Community Violence: Now is the Time, U.S. Department of
Education, availableat http://www.ed.gov/school-safety.
266. Id.
267. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
268. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 92-93 (1st Cir. 2008) (upholding the schools flat
denial of a request by parents that they be given the option of exempting their kindergarten
and first-grade children from presentation of literature extoling homosexuality, which was in
conflict with their sincerely held religious beliefs).
269. Id. at 105.
270. Shulman, supra note 250, at 347-48.("Compulsory education requirements
presuppose sympathetic and critical engagement with beliefs and ways of life at odds with
the culture of the family or religious or ethnic group into which the child is born. They entail
the effort to foster respect for difference and a willingness to entertain, if only for the sake of
argument, ideas that go against the familial grain.") (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). This view of schools is not new. President Woodrow Wilson "often said that the
use of a university is to make young gentlemen as unlike their fathers as possible" by taking
them out of the "narrow circle" of their fathers' opinions. Woodrow Wilson,The Power of
Christian Young Men, SELECTED ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF WOODROw WILSON 49 (1918)

availableat http://www.wallbuilders.com/LIBissuesArticles.asp?id=19484.
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bias would be permissible instructional requirements as long as the child is
not asked to verbally affirm a personal belief that guns are bad.27 '
In summary, parents may choose between public and private school, but
once they choose public school, it is a "well recognized" proposition that
"they do not have a constitutional right to direct how a public school
teaches their child."272 If parents are not happy with the education their
children are receiving in the public school, then they should simply choose
a different educational alternative. 27 3 The argument is not a new one. The
Barnette dissent noted that the Court had unanimously held previously that
the First Amendment is curtailed in public universities because students
choose to attend there.2 74 Similarly, the dissent noted that a student may not
contest the regulations of a private school to which parents voluntarily send
their children.275 The dissent would have applied the same rationale to the
Barnette facts and allowed the state to require all children to pledge
allegiance with a stiff-armed salute, forcing those who disagree to find
alternative educational arrangements.27 6 The dissent reasoned that parents
may choose the school that they wish their children to attend, and those
schools run by the state should have the authority to inculcate the values
and beliefs the state sees fit to teach.277 Similarly, if school officials force
upon students instruction that is inimical to the religious or moral beliefs of
their parents, the parents should "seek recourse to the normal political
processes for change in the town and state."7
The court-embraced view that parents are free to leave the public school
system ignores the lack of real choices available to parents because of the
dominance of public schools and the financial burden of supporting the
public schools through taxes in addition to funding an alternative mode of
education. Even more unfounded is the view that parents stuck with public
schools willingly cede their parental authority to school officials.
271. See Parker, 514 F.3d. at 106 ("Requiring a student to read a particular book is
generally not coercive of free exercise rights.").
272. Id. at 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
273. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 420 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
274. W. Va State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 656 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
275. Id. at 657-58 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The dissent noted the extra burden on
these families resulting from paying taxes to support the public schools even though the
parents do not use them. Id.
276. Id. at 657.
277. Id. at 658.
278. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 107 (1st Cir. 2008).
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It is a dangerous fiction to pretend that parents simply delegate
their authority-including their authority to determine what
their children may say and hear-to public school authorities...
. It is therefore wrong to treat public school officials, for purposes
relevant to the First Amendment, as if they were private,
2
nongovernmental actors standing in loco parentis. "
The solution is to give parents real choice and control in making the
educational decisions for their children.280
V. PROTECTING CHILDREN'S FREEDOM OF THE MIND

The issue of gun-related speech in schools is important on both an
individual and societal level. For the individual student and her family, the
battle is for the freedom of the mind and the fundamental question of who
has the responsibility and authority to train a child's mind to hold certain
values and opinions. For society, the issue is related to whether society
should value uniformity or diversity of opinion. Gun-related speech weighs
heavily in these ideological discussions because two liberties recognized in
the Bill of Rights are implicated: freedom of speech and the right to keep
and bear arms. The Barnette Court was concerned that schools would
indoctrinate children to view those rights recognized in our founding
documents as mere platitudes.28 ' Although the Barnette Court was speaking
of religious and speech rights, the Court's concern is equally applicable to
inculcating a negative view of the Second Amendment.
The solution is to give parents real choice in the education of their
children. Parents who choose government-run schools are choosing
inculcation of those opinions and views taught there. Parents, rather than
government officials, then become the ones to prescribe what shall be
taught to their children and Justice Jackson's "fixed star" remains a guiding
principle. At the same time, because parents are controlling their children's
279. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,424 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
280. Arguably, the most complete solution might be to eliminate all government
involvement in education and return responsibility to parents completely. This view of
education would align most closely with the views of Madison and Jefferson who believed
that the use of tax subsidies for the teaching of opinions was contrary to the law of nature
and that tax money is no more proper for subsidizing schools than it is for subsidizing
churches. See Titus, supra note 251, at 511. But Virginia was the exception. So the solution
presented here will be preliminary steps that could be realistically accomplished in a majority
of jurisdictions.
281. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,637 (1943).
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education, Justice Thomas's view that the First Amendment has little
application within school operation becomes a complementary guiding
principle. Any policy, then, that increases parental choice is a step in the
right direction.
A. The Universal Voucher as Solution
Government-run schools enjoy the advantages of being subsidized so
that they do not have to be efficient, of being able to offer "free" education
to families, and of holding a virtual monopoly of school facilities while
mandating school attendance.282 A universal voucher system is the most
direct, immediate, and efficient method to restore choice to parents.283
Vouchers provide competition to public schools and thereby increase
efficiency and responsiveness to the wants and needs of families. Further, a
wide range of options exist for education if financial constraints are
removed. These include private tutors, charter schools, private schools, and
traditional public schools.284
Where vouchers have been implemented, parents often, but certainly not
always, choose a private school where the power of the consumer is the
strongest.2 85 Approximately 28,000 private schools educate 5 million
students annually.286 Studies consistently show that children enrolled in
282. Allen M. Brabender, The Crumbling Wall and Free Competition: Formulafor Success
in America's Schools, 79 N.D. L. REv. 11 (2003) (citing Thomas L. Good & Jennifer S. Braden,
The Great School Debate 90, 100 (2000)). In Newark, New Jersey, for example, only 22% of
students graduated on time, in spite of spending over $22,000 per student, twice the national
average. In Washington, D.C., roughly 50% of students graduate on time, in spite of $24,000
spent per student. Nicholas Dagostino, Note, Giving the School Bully A Timeout: Protecting
Urban Studentsfrom Teachers' Unions, 63 ALA. L. REV. 177, 180 (2011).
283. An "educational voucher" has been defined as "an entitlement extended to an
individual by a government permitting that individual to receive educational services up to
the maximum dollar amount specified. The holder can normally redeem the voucher
according to preference at any institution or enterprise approved by the granting agency."
Brabender, supra note 282, at 12 (quoting AUSTIN D. SWANSON & RICHARD A. KING, SCHOOL
FINANCE: ITS POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 414 (2d ed. 1997)).

284. Ira Bloom, The New ParentalRights Challenge to School Control: Has the Supreme
Court MandatedSchool Choice?, 32 J.L. & Educ. 139, 141 (2003).
285. The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of school vouchers, even when
the vouchers are used at parochial schools as long as parents have a genuine and
independent choice. Brabender, supra note 282, at 30-31 (discussing Simmons-Harris v.
Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 949 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002)).
286. Suzanne Hansen, School Vouchers: The Answer to a Failing PublicSchool System, 23
HAMLINE J.PUB. L. & POL'Y 73, 89 (2001).
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private schools through voucher programs outperform their public school
peers.287 Additionally, providing parents with a choice resulted by itself in
increased involvement by parents even when the education was "free" to the
parents.288
Charter schools,289 which are neither private schools nor typical
government-run schools, provide parents with another educational option.
Charter schools have the same strong incentive to fulfill the desires and
expectations of the parents who choose to send their children there.
Although the schools are often paid for with vouchers, and thus "free" to
the parent, the parent still has power to affect school policy because the
parent can easily choose to go elsewhere.

287. Id. at 90 (noting that children using vouchers in San Antonio, Texas to attend
private schools "were more challenged academically, experienced less fighting and disorder
than their public school peers, and their parents were more involved in their school and with
their studies"). Parents using vouchers to proactively choose a school for their children have
high "customer satisfaction" and low-income, low-achieving, and minority students show
academic improvement in a short time. Brabender, supra note 282, at 37 (citing a study by
the RAND organization, a nonprofit research and analysis organization). On the other hand,
children trapped in inner-city public schools remain casualties of an ineffective and failing
system. Id. at 37-38 (noting that before the Cleveland implemented its voucher system, "one
in fourteen students" was the ratio that marked both the number of students assaulted on
school property and the number of students that passed the twelfth grade proficiency test).
Students forced to attend failing schools risk lifelong consequences. Bloom, supra note 284,
at 179-80 (noting that New York City alone has fifty-eight schools under Registration
Review for very poor student results on standardized tests and that parents are seeking
alternatives because students who have not completed high school have an unemployment
rate twice as high has those who finish).
288. Hansen, supra note 286, at 90 (discussing a private voucher system in San Antonio,
Texas where the voucher paid the entire amount of the tuition).
289.
Charter schools are independent public schools, initiated and operated by
entities and groups such as teachers, parents, community organizations,
colleges, universities, and educational entrepreneurs.... Charter schools: 1)
operate based upon a detailed written agreement-the charter-for a specified
period; 2) exist as public legal entities, separate in some way from the local
school district in which they are located; 3) operate free from many state and
local regulations applicable to public schools; 4) receive operational funding
from public funds, and make budget decisions at the school level; 5) are
relatively free to adopt instructional and curriculum protocols; 6) are free to
manage decisions, including hiring and budgeting, at the school level; and 7)
give sponsors, including in many cases teachers and parents, the opportunity to
participate in the design of schools.
Bloom, supra note 284, at 151-52.
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Some voucher programs target specific groups, such as those who have
low incomes or those in a district with a poor-performing school. The
Milwaukee school district program, for example, provides vouchers for
school children whose families have income not more than 1.75 times the
federal poverty level.290 In contrast, Florida implemented a voucher
program open to families regardless of income if the public school to which
they were assigned received a grade of "F" based on student academic
performance for two out of four years.29 1 In both programs, students
showed gains in math and reading tests almost immediately. 2 92
Although targeted voucher programs are designed to solve specific
deficiencies, these limited programs do not address the basic problem that
parents lack control over their children's education. As long as parents en
masse have no realistic alternatives to government-run schools, then
government officials will be free to create "standardized children." Where a
universal voucher program is implemented, however, parents may choose
the school that teaches students consistent with community and family
values.293 Parents will choose private schools or charter schools where those
schools best meet the educational goals of the parent. Those children left in
public schools will be there either because their parents choose the school's
educational policies or because the parents are simply too uninterested to
make another choice.
A small-scale universal voucher system has been tried for over ten years
in San Antonio, Texas. A non-profit organization created the Horizon
Program, which allows any student in the Edgewood School District to
attend a private school, or another public school, if they choose. 294 The
vouchers are not contingent on any criteria, including income, school

290. Hansen, supra note 286, at 80.
291. Id. at 86-87.
292. Id. at 89. Similarly, the voucher program in Cleveland, which suffers from low
graduation rates, gives vouchers to children of low-income families. Id. at 83. By the second
year of the program, low-income children using vouchers to attend private schools showed a
five percentile gain in reading scores and a fifteen percentile gain in math scores on national
standardized tests. Id. at 89.
293. A detailed discussion of the logistics of a universal voucher system is beyond the
scope of this Comment, but see Jacob Blizzard, Where Have All the Taxes Gone: Creatingand
Administering a Working Education System for Texas Through Universal Vouchers, 13 TEX.
TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 209, 211 (Summer 2012), for a discussion on implementation, funding,
and logistics of a universal voucher system.
294. Id.
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performance, or affiliation of the private school.2 95 Interestingly, only 10%
of the students receiving vouchers chose a private school over transferring
to another public school.296 The impact on the public school, as well as the
students who received vouchers, was impressive almost immediately.
Within four years, reading scores improved by 21%, and math scores
improved by 28%.297 Many other benefits also accrued because of the
program, 298 but the primary reason for adopting a universal voucher
program is not because of the outstanding increases in student achievement
and community development. If these were the goals, then parents should
be forced to use vouchers and place their children in private schools. But
forcing parents to make choices that would seem to benefit their children is
the very evil to be combatted. Universal vouchers provide parents with a
realistic choice in their child's education. If parents choose public schools,
then that choice too should be respected.2 99
B. Choice of Teachers
Choice only exists if private or charter schools retain control over those
things that make a school distinctive. Foundational to that distinction is the
ability to establish a particular worldview and to hire teachers who can
competently teach from that worldview-and fire those who cannot.
Individual public schools should be given the same authority as charter
schools to hire and retain competent teachers and fire incompetent ones. In
order to give parents realistic choice, a program must allow parents to
choose the teacher. In early American schools, the parents chose teachers,

295. Id.
296. Id. at 229. The families that did choose private school were in the lowest income
bracket and were almost exclusively minorities. Id.
297. Id. at 230.
298. Id. The program created many first generation graduates, 92% of which attended
college after graduation. The school district itself rose from "acceptable" to "recognized" for
the first time in its history. Teacher salaries increased. Property values rose, and new housing
construction began. Id.
299. Surprisingly, of the 900 students who qualified for a Florida voucher because their
school received an "F" for student academic performance, only 140 chose to participate in
the voucher program. Thus, the vast majority of students in the failing school remained
there. Importantly, the "fact that some children are left behind is the result of parental
choice. Parents could have elected to send their children to a higher performing public
school, or to the private school of their choice." Hansen, supra note 286, at 87-88. Out of the
140 using vouchers, only 57 enrolled in private schools.
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not schools.300 In this way, parents controlled the worldview from which
their children were trained. Today, tenure statutes and collective bargaining
contracts result in poorly performing teachers being protected from
dismissal from government because teachers are retained based on seniority
rather than excellence.o Teacher effectiveness is never a criteria for
determining which teachers gain tenure, and thereby cannot be fired.302 As
long as public schools are saddled with incompetent teachers, parents have
less chance of choosing a teacher who can effectively teach as an agent of
the parent. Therefore, control over hiring and firing should be returned to
the school level, not the school district level, and the principal must have
the ability to respond to parental concerns. A voucher system whereby
money is directed to the teacher and school of the parent's choice will
reward those teachers who are competent and those schools that operate
well.
For the same reason, "school boards" need to be at the school level and
not the district level. The consolidation of districts has resulted in a lack of
representation and control for parents whose children attend a particular
school. Where a school board is concerned with the policies of a particular
school, rather than a conglomerate of schools, it will be more responsive to
parental input and community needs.
Parents cannot have real choice unless they also have reliable
information upon which to make the choice. Arguably, the government can
fulfill a legitimate role by ensuring that parents have information about
their children's progress and the academic progress of students taught by a

300. See discussion supra Part IV.A (noting that education was accomplished through
tutors or community employment of an educator on a yearly basis).
301. Dagostino, supra note 282, at 179. For example, an elementary school in a violent
California neighborhood, a 93% poverty rate, and a history of academic failure dramatically
increased the scores of its students on standardized tests by replacing the teaching staff. This
is the type of school administration and teaching staff that should command contract
renewals and merit pay rewards. Quite the contrary, when the district needed to lay off
teachers due to an economic downturn, the new teachers were laid off first under a statutemandated "last-in, first-out" policy. The connection between quality teaching and pay and
retention is extremely attenuated. Id.
302. Id. at 193. Some of the more notorious examples include a Los Angeles teacher who
told a student who had attempted to commit suicide that next time he should cut his wrists
deeper and another Los Angeles teacher who kept pornography, marijuana, and cocaine at
school. Id. The average cost to get rid of an incompetent teachers like these is $500,000. Id.
As a result, students in New York City are "protected" from the worst teachers when the
school district pays the teacher for performing no service.
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particular teacher and in particular schools."' This information is usually
obtained through standardized testing. Only when a neutral third party
oversees the testing can reliable information be assured.
V. CONCLUSION

The answer to whether censorship of innocent gun-related speech and
play is an inculcation of community values or an unconstitutional
establishment of orthodoxy depends on one's view of the role of schools. If,
as the most recent Supreme Court cases seem to advocate, the state bears
the responsibility to train children to be good citizens, then school officials
have the role of determining what is appropriate speech and conduct. But if,
in keeping with America's early history and Court decisions, it is the
parents who should have the responsibility for and control over their
children's education, then parents must be given realistic choice. This
choice can be accomplished quickly and effectively through a universal
voucher program. When parents, not government officials, determine how
the child should be educated, then Justice Jackson's "fixed star" that no
government official should establish an orthodoxy is realized. The judicial
system is poorly suited to balancing the speech rights of children against the
need of schools to maintain order. But only where educational choices are
under the jurisdiction of parents can the courts justly withdraw its
protection of student speech rights.

303. Bloom, supra note 284, at 179 (noting that the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
required schools to establish a way to measure that they had met yearly progress targets).

